UIC School of Law

UIC Law Open Access Repository
UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship
2022

Deregulation and the 'Gig Academy', 67 Wayne L. Rev. 151 (2022)
Karen H. Cross
UIC School of Law, khcross@uic.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Karen Halverson Cross, Deregulation and the 'Gig Academy', 67 Wayne L. Rev. 151 (2022)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/facpubs/869
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been accepted
for inclusion in UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access
Repository. For more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

DEREGULATION AND THE ‘GIG ACADEMY’
KAREN HALVERSON CROSS†
ABSTRACT: ............................................................................................ 151
I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................... 152
II. WHY RELIANCE ON PART-TIME FACULTY MATTERS FROM AN
ACCREDITATION STANDPOINT ....................................................... 154
A. The “Gig Academy”................................................................... 155
B. Effect of Full-Time Faculty Adequacy on Program Quality ...... 160
III. HIGHER EDUCATION ACCREDITATION ............................................ 165
IV. ABA FULL-TIME FACULTY REQUIREMENTS .................................. 172
A. Standards on Full-Time Faculty Size and Instructional Role .... 173
B. Federal Pressure and Its Effect on ABA Enforcement ............... 182
V. RULES, STANDARDS, AND REGULATORY DISCLOSURE ................... 190
A. Rules versus Standards .............................................................. 191
B. Regulatory Disclosure................................................................ 195
1. ABA Standard 509................................................................ 201
2. College Navigator ................................................................ 203
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 207
APPENDIX: RECENT ABA SANCTIONS AND WITHDRAWALS OF
APPROVAL ...................................................................................... 209
ABSTRACT
For decades, colleges and universities in the U.S. have responded to
increased competition, shrinking budgets, and other challenges by relying
on growing numbers of part-time faculty. Scholars use the phrase “gig
academy” to analogize higher education institutions and their growing
reliance on adjunct faculty to the gig economy. This Article examines how
the government and higher education accreditors have relaxed full-time
faculty requirements at colleges and universities, failing to constrain a
drastic increase of gig workers in academia. When evaluating institutional
quality, accreditors and the federal government focus less on an
institution’s faculty resources than on student outcomes, such as
graduation and debt default rates. Although holding institutions
†
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accountable for student success is often appropriate, a negative
consequence of this approach has been a lack of transparency and absence
of public accountability regarding a college or university’s investment in
its faculty. The ABA, in contrast, maintains relatively strict full-time
faculty requirements. But in response to pressure from the federal
government, even the ABA has relaxed enforcement of these requirements
over time. The Article argues that the ABA’s strict rule-based approach
may err on the side of raising educational costs but is preferable to
reliance on vague standards. It also considers ways to improve public
disclosure of higher education institutions’ reliance on adjunct faculty.
I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, colleges and universities in the U.S. have responded to
increased competition, shrinking budgets, and other challenges by relying
on growing numbers of adjunct faculty.1 Scholars use the phrase “gig
academy” to analogize higher education institutions to the gig economy.2
Traditional faculty roles of teaching and research have been unbundled,
and part-time faculty are hired to do work more cheaply at the expense of
student learning.3 Like Uber drivers, adjunct faculty typically bear the
costs of production associated with their work, including office space,
computers, telephone, and internet, in addition to health insurance and
other employee benefits.4 The lack of security or regulatory control
associated with these types of employment contracts undermines academic
freedom and de-professionalizes faculty.5
1. See infra Part II.A. This Article uses the terms “adjunct faculty” and “part-time
faculty” interchangeably. It uses “full-time faculty” as the ABA Standards define the term:
as a person whose “primary professional employment” is with the law school and who
devotes “substantially all working time” during the academic year to faculty
responsibilities (teaching, scholarship, and service). See infra note 131 and accompanying
text.
In contrast, the U.S. Department of Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education
Data System (IPEDS) survey, which institutions must complete as a condition to remain
eligible for student financial aid, leaves the differentiation between part-time and full-time
faculty (“instructional staff”) to the reporting institution. IPEDS Survey Components:
Human Resources Glossary, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS,
https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/use-the-data/survey-components/3/human-resources [http://web.
archive.org/web/20210929210039/https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/use-the-data/surveycomponents/3/human-resources] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021).
2. See generally ADRIANNA KEZAR, TOM DEPAOLA, & DANIEL T. SCOTT, THE GIG
ACADEMY: MAPPING LABOR IN THE NEOLIBERAL UNIVERSITY (2019).
3. Id. at 24 (restructuring has occurred in spite of its “documented negative effects on
teaching and learning”).
4. Id. at 27.
5. GARY HALL, THE UBERFICATION OF THE UNIVERSITY 20–22 (2016).
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This Article examines how the government and higher education
accreditors have relaxed full-time faculty requirements at colleges and
universities, failing to constrain a drastic increase of gig workers in
academia.6 The basic purpose of accreditation is quality assurance,7 not
protecting faculty working conditions. But over-reliance on adjunct
faculty can adversely affect institutional quality.8 As the history of higher
education accreditation suggests, the odds are low that an accrediting body
would withhold approval from a college or university based solely on its
over-reliance on adjunct faculty. When evaluating institutional quality,
accreditors and the federal government focus less on an institution’s
faculty resources than on student outcomes, such as graduation and debt
default rates. Although holding institutions accountable for student
success is often appropriate,9 a negative consequence of this approach has
been a lack of transparency and absence of public accountability regarding
a college or university’s investment (or under-investment) in its faculty.
The Council of the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar10 maintains relatively strict full-time
faculty requirements compared with those of other accreditors.11 But in
response to pressure from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
U.S. Department of Education (DOE), even the ABA has relaxed its
interpretation and enforcement of these requirements over time.12

6. About half of college and university faculty (and 60% of law school faculty) are
hired on a part-time basis. See infra note 16 and accompanying text and Appendix II. Since
IPEDS leaves the definition of “full-time” and “part-time” faculty to the reporting
institution, the figure for college and university faculty is an approximation. Supra note 1.
7. See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. However, basing accountability on student outcomes may unfairly penalize certain
institutions and should be approached carefully. See infra notes 116–117 and
accompanying text.
10. The U.S. Department of Education recognizes the ABA Council as an accrediting
body for purposes of eligibility for federal student financial aid. Accreditation in the
United States: Institutional Accrediting Agencies, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.
gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation_pg6.html [http://web.archive.org/web/
20210922130757/https://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation_pg6.html]
(last visited Dec. 28, 2021).
11. See infra Part IV.A. This Article focuses on the ABA’s full-time faculty
requirements, contrasting them with other accreditation standards. It does not address the
related issue of security of position for full-time faculty. But the ABA is also unique as an
accrediting body in its requirements relating to security of position and tenure. The ABA
requires institutions to adopt policies on academic freedom and tenure and to afford
security of position similar to tenure for clinical faculty. For scholarship addressing the
ABA’s standards on security of position, see infra note 126.
12. See infra Part IV.B.
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There is little scholarship addressing the faculty investments required
of higher education institutions.13 This Article argues that the ABA’s rulebased approach may err on the side of raising educational costs but is
preferable to reliance on vague standards. The Article also considers ways
to improve public disclosure of higher education institutions’ investments
in full-time faculty. Part II addresses why over-reliance on part-time
faculty should matter to accreditors. Part III provides background on
higher education accreditation. Part IV discusses the evolution of the
ABA’s full-time faculty requirements and examines the ABA’s shift away
from vigorous enforcement of these requirements in response to pressure
from the federal government. Part V contrasts the ABA’s specific, fulltime faculty requirements with those of other accrediting bodies and
evaluates these differences based on the literature addressing rules versus
standards. Part V also considers how accreditor disclosure requirements
might better promote transparency and institutional accountability relating
to full-time faculty adequacy.
II. WHY RELIANCE ON PART-TIME FACULTY MATTERS FROM AN
ACCREDITATION STANDPOINT
Similar to companies in other economic sectors, colleges and
universities in the U.S. have responded to increased competition, shrinking
budgets, and other challenges by relying on increasing numbers of
contingent faculty. In 2016, close to three-quarters of higher education

13. Gaston raises, but does not address in detail, whether accreditors should regulate
an institution’s heavy reliance on contingent faculty when it compromises educational
quality. PAUL L. GASTON, HIGHER EDUCATION ACCREDITATION: HOW IT’S CHANGING, WHY
IT MUST 65 (2014). Calls for accrediting bodies to address over-reliance on part-time
faculty have been reported in the press. See Courtney Leatherman, Do Accreditors Look
the Other Way When Colleges Rely on Part-Timers? CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 7, 1997),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/Do-Accreditors-Look-the-Other/101380 [http://web.
archive.org/web/20210929210432/https://www.chronicle.com/article/do-accreditorslook-the-other-way-when-colleges-rely-on-part-timers/]; Peter Schmidt, Accreditation Is
Eyed as a Means to Aid Adjuncts, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 25, 2012), https://www.
chronicle.com/article/Accreditation-Is-Eyed-as-a/131292 [http://web.archive.org/web/
20210929210532/https://www.chronicle.com/article/accreditation-is-eyed-as-a-means-toaid-adjuncts/]. The American Association of University Professors (AAUP) has surveyed
regional accreditors’ rules on the use of part-time faculty. Earl Henry, Looking the Other
Way? Accreditation Standards and Part-Time Faculty, AM. ASS’N UNIV. PROFESSORS,
https://www.aaup.org/AAUP/comm/rep/accredpt.htm [http://web.archive.org/web/20210
930225530/https://www.aaup.org/AAUP/comm/rep/accredpt.htm] (last visited Jun. 30,
2020). For a critique of the ABA accreditation standards (including their full-time faculty
requirements) on grounds that they stifle competition, see Marina Lao, Discrediting
Accreditation?: Antitrust and Legal Education, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 1035 (2001).
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instructional faculty were in non-tenure-track positions.14 Notably, a
significant and growing share of higher education faculty are hired on a
part-time basis. Part-time faculty made up under 22% of all higher
education faculty in 1970.15 By 2014, this percentage had increased to over
56% of all higher education faculty; reliance on part-time faculty was
especially high in the community college (69%) and for-profit (84%)
sectors.16 Part-time faculty can be as effective in the classroom as full-time
faculty. However, the terms of their employment are such that it is not
realistic to expect part-time faculty to engage in student relationship
building or to participate in the research or service work generally
expected of full-time faculty. Similarly, due to the terms of their
employment, part-time faculty typically are not capable of undertaking the
substantial and ongoing work necessary to maintain and improve
academic programs. Finally, heavy reliance on part-time faculty
undermines academic freedom.
A. The “Gig Academy”
Over the past half-century, economic and social changes have created
significant challenges for universities. These challenges include budget
constraints (as costs rise and government support stagnates or declines),
an increasingly competitive climate, demographic and technological
changes, and public calls for accountability.17 Institutions increasingly

14. Relying on 2016 IPEDS data, the AAUP reported that 73% of instructional faculty
in U.S. higher education institutions (including graduate assistants) were in non-tenuretrack positions. Data Snapshot: Contingent Faculty in US Higher Ed, AM. ASS’N UNIV.
PROFESSORS, (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.aaup.org/news/data-snapshot-contingentfaculty-us-higher-ed#.XvJkned7k2x [http://web.archive.org/web/20210929210808/
https://www.aaup.org/news/data-snapshot-contingent-faculty-us-higher-ed].
15. Relying on 1970 IPEDS data, Schuster and Finkelstein reported that 104,000 out
of 474,000, or 21.9%, of all faculty in U.S. higher education institutions (not including
graduate assistants) were in part-time positions. JACK H. SCHUSTER & MARTIN J.
FINKELSTEIN, THE AMERICAN FACULTY: THE RESTRUCTURING OF ACADEMIC WORK AND
CAREERS 40–41 (2006).
16. Number and Percentage Distribution of Instructional Staff at Title IV DegreeGranting Institutions Other than Medical Schools, By Sector of Institution and Employment
Status: United States, Fall 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014 (2017), NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STAT., INTEGRATED POSTSECONDARY EDUC. DATA SYS. (2017), https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/
Search?query=&query2=&resultType=all&page=1&sortBy=date_desc&sources=Tables
%20Library&overlayTableId=12389 [https://web.archive.org/web/20220104143108/http
s://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/search/ViewTable?isOverlay=true&tableId=12389&_=1641306667
837]. The data excludes medical school instructional staff and graduate assistants.
17. JUDITH M. GAPPA ET AL., RETHINKING FACULTY WORK: HIGHER EDUCATION’S
STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE 7–14 (2007).
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respond to these challenges by relying on part-time and other non-tenuretrack faculty.
Motives behind hiring adjunct faculty can be more complex than mere
cost containment. Colleges and universities may hire part-time faculty to
replace faculty on temporary leave, expand course offerings in areas
subject to temporary increases in enrollment, or accommodate an
expansion in remedial courses.18 Institutions may also rely on adjunct
faculty to enhance institutional flexibility and bring in experts who possess
unique practical experience but would not be eligible for the tenure track.19
At the same time, institutions hire faculty on an adjunct basis for
reasons of cost and convenience. Colleges and universities, even public
ones, increasingly function less like social institutions and more like
corporations subject to market pressures.20 Thus, changes in faculty
structure at colleges and universities mirror restructuring that has occurred
in the broader economy in response to market competition and
globalization. Higher education scholars invoke management theorist
Charles Handy’s concept of a shamrock organization, with one leaf—the
managerial core—becoming an ever-smaller proportion of the workforce
while the other two leaves—self-employed professionals and contingent
workers—increase in number. Like shamrock organizations, college and
university workforces are stratifying, with tenure-line faculty at the core.21
The restructuring of labor in higher education institutions has been
characterized as an “academic star system undergirded by a vast new
‘academic proletariat.’”22 Kezar et al.’s characterization of higher
education as the “gig academy” draws a similar analogy.23 The point is
that at many (perhaps most) institutions, reliance on part-time faculty has
become more about cost containment than about filling a temporary
curricular need or bringing a professional perspective to the classroom.
Indeed, adjunct faculty are utilized more heavily in some higher
education sectors than others. Generally speaking, the less research18. JOHN G. CROSS & EDIE N. GOLDENBERG, OFF TRACK PROFS: NONTENURED
TEACHERS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 31 (2009).
19. ROGER G. BALDWIN & JAY L. CHRONISTER, TEACHING WITHOUT TENURE: POLICIES
AND PRACTICES FOR A NEW ERA 128–29 (2002).
20. Patricia J. Gumport, Academic Restructuring: Organizational Change and
Institutional Imperatives, 39(1) HIGHER EDUC. 67, 70–71 (2000); Risa L. Lieberwitz,
Faculty in the Corporate University: Professional Identity, Law and Collective Action, 16
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 263, 301 (2007). For a case study of the corporatization of
higher education, based on the University of Texas at Austin’s closing of a student film
program, see UNIVERSITY, INC. (Kyle Henry 1999), available at http://vimeo.com/689090
36 [http://web.archive.org/web/20210414032859/https://vimeo.com/68909036].
21. GAPPA ET AL., supra note 17, at 15.
22. SCHUSTER & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 15, at 340.
23. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text.

2022]

DEREGULATION AND THE 'GIG ACADEMY'

157

intensive the institution, the more heavily the institution tends to rely on
part-time instructors.24 As noted, reliance on part-time faculty is
particularly pronounced in the community-college and for-profit sectors,
where in 2014, 69% and 84% of the sector’s faculty, respectively, were
hired on a part-time basis.25
Institutions typically hire their adjunct faculty on a semester-tosemester basis, and often within a few weeks of the beginning of classes.26
If the institution’s scheduling needs change (e.g., due to under-enrollment
in a course), an adjunct may learn at the beginning of the semester that
their course has been canceled, losing out on compensation for the time
spent preparing to teach the course.27 The median salary paid to adjunct
faculty is about $2,700 for a three-credit course,28 and the vast majority of
adjuncts do not have access to employer-sponsored health care or other
benefits.29 Adjunct faculty often are not provided an office, computer, or
telephone to do their work.30
The uncertainty of employment and low pay associated with adjunct
teaching may not be problematic for professionals who are teaching an
occasional course on the side. But for faculty who rely on teaching as their
principal means of making a living, adjunct working conditions can be
exploitative. Childress describes an adjunct who, during one semester,
taught four different writing-intensive courses to over 100 students at two
different universities, both located over fifty miles from her home.31 Since
the pay was so low, the instructor picked up additional tutoring and
freelancing jobs to make ends meet.32 As of 2015, 31% of part-time faculty
lived near or below the poverty line and 25% of families of part-time

24. The AAUP’s presentation of 2016 IPEDS data shows that a sector’s share of parttime faculty as a percentage of all instructional faculty ranged from approximately 15% in
Carnegie R1 institutions (doctoral universities with very high research activity) to almost
70% in the associates degree (community college) sector. The data do not differentiate forprofit institutions. AM. ASS’N UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 14.
25. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
26. KEZAR ET AL., supra note 2, at 43.
27. Id. at 44.
28. HERB CHILDRESS, THE ADJUNCT UNDERCLASS: HOW AMERICA’S COLLEGES
BETRAYED THEIR FACULTY, THEIR STUDENTS, AND THEIR MISSION 11 (2019).
29. KEZAR ET AL., supra note 2, at 45.
30. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
31. CHILDRESS, supra note 28, at 3–4.
32. Id.
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faculty either enrolled in public assistance programs or qualified for the
Earned Income Tax Credit.33
It is not surprising that institutional reliance on part-time faculty, and
the deterioration of faculty working conditions associated with this shift,
has led to faculty unionization. Despite legal restrictions on college and
university faculty’s right to collectively bargain,34 the level of unionized
faculty in colleges and universities is significantly higher than that of other
unionized employees in the U.S. workforce. Only 12% of the U.S.
workforce was unionized in 2010,35 compared with 27% of higher
education faculty in 2012.36 By 2012, the number of unionized faculty had
33. Caroline Frederickson, There Is No Excuse for How Universities Treat Adjuncts,
THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 15, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/hi
gher-education-college-adjunct-professor-salary/404461/ [http://web.archive.org/web/
20210924084813/https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/highereducation-college-adjunct-professor-salary/404461/]. Frederickson describes a homeless
adjunct instructor who prepared courses in friends’ apartments or her car, referring to her
office as “the Pontiac Vibe parked on Stewart Avenue.” Id.
34. In N. L. R. B. v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980), the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) does not apply to faculty who exercise
managerial authority within a university. Because of Yeshiva, most faculty at private higher
education institutions are effectively excluded from the protections of the NLRA. But if
contingent faculty lack the status and authority that tenure-line faculty enjoy, Yeshiva
should not be a bar and thus the NLRA should apply. The irony is that, by giving greater
authority (such as the right to participate in governance) to its part-time faculty, an
institution can strengthen its legal challenge to unionization based on Yeshiva. William A.
Herbert, The Winds of Changes Shift: An Analysis of Recent Growth in Bargaining Units
and Representation Efforts in Higher Education, 8 J. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACAD. 1
(2016). In contrast, collective bargaining at public colleges and universities is governed by
state law, not the NLRA, and thus is unaffected by the Yeshiva decision. Many public
college and university faculty are unionized in states whose laws allow collective
bargaining. For a listing of faculty collective bargaining units, see JOE BERRY & MICHELLE
SAVARESE, DIRECTORY OF U.S. FACULTY CONTRACTS AND BARGAINING AGENTS IN
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION (2012).
As currently interpreted by the NLRB, the NLRA also does not protect faculty at
religiously affiliated institutions. The NLRB recently held it lacked jurisdiction over
religiously affiliated higher education institutions on First Amendment grounds. Bethany
Coll., 369 N.L.R.B. 98 (2020); see also Duquesne Univ. of the Holy Spirit v. NLRB, 947
F.3d 824 (D.C. Cir. 2020). This legal development has already affected faculty unions; in
May 2020 the board of Saint Xavier University, an institution affiliated with the Catholic
Church, announced it would no longer recognize its 40-year-old faculty union. Deanna
Isaacs, After 40 Years, Saint Xavier University Wipes Out Its Faculty Union, CHI. READER
(Jun. 10, 2020), https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/after-40-years-saint-xavieruniversity-wipes-out-its-faculty-union/Content?oid=80559707 [http://web.archive.org/
web/20210929211331/https://chicagoreader.com/columns-opinion/after-40-years-saintxavier-university-wipes-out-its-faculty-union/].
35. Ann M. May et al., Representation of Women Faculty at Public Research
Universities: Do Unions Matter?, 63 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 699, 703 (2010).
36. BERRY & SAVARESE, supra note 34, at vi.
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increased by 14% from 2006.37 Recent unionization drives have been
particularly successful with adjunct and other non-tenure-track faculty. Of
the thirty-one new collective bargaining units for higher education faculty
certified in 2016, over 70% (twenty-two) were non-tenure-track faculty
units, and of the non-tenure-track faculty units, twenty of them included
part-time faculty; seven of the units were made up of only part-time
faculty.38
As Kezar and co-authors warned, continued displacement of labor
from higher education institutions threatens to undermine fundamental
tenets of academia—tenure, shared governance, academic freedom, and
the “public good function of the university.”39 In response to this threat,
they recommend focusing on various forms of collective action to
democratize the academic workplace, including collectivist forms of
unionizing,40 advocacy alliances,41 and expanded shared governance
models that include contingent faculty.42 They also recommend public
interest bargaining, an approach to collective bargaining that focuses on
addressing social interests in addition to party interests.43 In the context of
education, social interests are those of students and other stakeholders.44
Examples of public interest bargaining in education include the Chicago
Teachers’ Union strike campaigns focused on equity for students;45 a
graduate student union contract that includes benefits for students who do
diversity and inclusion work;46 and a course cancellation clause in an
37. Id. at ix.
38. Herbert, supra note 34, at 2–8 (data compiled from Tables 1–4).
39. KEZAR ET AL., supra note 2, at 148–50.
40. Id. at 153–54.
41. Id. at 156–57. One example of an advocacy alliance is the New Faculty Majority.
See NEW FACULTY MAJORITY, http://www.newfacultymajority.info/ [http://web.archive.o
rg/web/20210929211448/http://www.newfacultymajority.info/] (last visited Dec. 28,
2021).
42. KEZAR ET AL., supra note 2, at 158. The Association of Governing Boards of
Universities and Colleges issued a statement on shared governance that expressly
recognizes the need to include the voices of contingent faculty (as well as those of students
and staff) when discussing important issues. AGB Board of Directors’ Statement on Shared
Governance, AGB (Oct. 10, 2017), https://agb.org/agb-statements/agb-board-of-directorsstatement-on-shared-governance/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20210930195541/https://
agb.org/agb-statements/agb-board-of-directors-statement-on-shared-governance/].
43. KEZAR ET AL., supra note 2, at 154–56.
44. Gary Rhoades, What Are We Negotiating For? Public Interest Bargaining, 7 J.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ACAD. 2 (2015).
45. Jackson Potter, What Other Unions Can Learn from the Historic Gains We Won in
the Chicago Teachers Strike, IN THESE TIMES BLOG (Nov. 26, 2019, 6:08 PM),
http://inthesetimes.com/working/entry/22187/chicago-teachers-strike-2019-labor-victory
[http://web.archive.org/web/20210506025500/https://inthesetimes.com/article/chicagoteachers-strike-2019-labor-victory].
46. KEZAR ET AL., supra note 2, at 134.
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adjunct faculty union contract that takes into account the interests of
students enrolled in the cancelled course.47
This Article evaluates higher education accreditation and its influence
on the disinvestment by U.S. colleges and universities in their faculty. As
discussed in Part III, accrediting bodies tend to focus on student outcomes
as opposed to institutional inputs; this focus allows colleges and
universities relatively free rein to hire few (or potentially no) full-time
faculty members. Although ABA standards are unique in requiring a
minimum threshold of full-time faculty, the ABA has relaxed enforcement
of its requirements in response to government pressure.
B. Effect of Full-Time Faculty Adequacy on Program Quality
The previous section addresses how adjunct working conditions can
exploit faculty. But substantial research has also shown that adjunct
working conditions can adversely affect educational quality, principally
because the lack of resources, support, and job security provided to
adjuncts tends to deny them the opportunity to be fully available to
students. Adjuncts often lack a space in which to store their belongings
while on campus, not to mention a private space in which to meet with
students.48 At one public university the “bullpen” was a common room
where instructors met with students; if an instructor’s office hours were
scheduled at a peak time, spare seats in the bullpen were difficult to find.49
Adjuncts are not compensated for extra time spent meeting with students
outside of class, and their low pay and long hours can lead to burnout.
Institutions tend not to provide orientation, mentoring, or professional
development to their adjuncts, or to evaluate their teaching.50 Referring to
the conditions51 adjuncts must work under, Childress concluded:
This is not a recipe for the attentive, patient mentoring of young
minds. These are not working conditions that allow for either
student or instructor to explore promising side roads, to make false

47. Rhoades, supra note 44, at 5.
48. Frederickson, supra note 33, at para. 20.
49. Id.
50. KEZAR ET AL., supra note 2, at 99–100; see also Donald G. Hackmann & Martha
M. McCarthy, What Constitutes a Critical Mass? An Investigation of Faculty Staffing
Patterns in Educational Leadership Programs, 8(1) J. RES. ON LEADERSHIP EDUC. 5, 10
(2013) (over a third of adjuncts developed their syllabi without faculty guidance and fewer
than a fifth of them were formally evaluated).
51. See supra notes 31, 32, and accompanying text.
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starts that later pay off in surprising ways. This is simply the
provision of a product at lowest cost.52
The point is not that adjuncts lack ability—unlike tenure-track faculty,
adjuncts, like other non-tenure-track faculty, tend to be hired specifically
to teach. Rather, the conditions of adjunct faculty employment tend to limit
what they can offer students in the way of relationship building.53
The unsupported and insecure nature of their employment also
adversely affects adjuncts’ pedagogy and grading practices. Analyzing
responses from a national survey of higher education instructional faculty,
Baldwin and Wawrzynski found that part-time faculty were less likely
than full-time faculty to employ learning-centered strategies in their
teaching.54 They also found part-time faculty to be significantly less likely
than full-time faculty to use technology (websites and email) to
communicate and interact with their students.55 The authors concluded that
the “fault lines” in teaching practices revealed by their research were
principally between part-time and full-time faculty, as opposed to
contingent and tenure-track faculty, giving “compelling reasons for
concern” over increasing reliance on part-time faculty in higher
education.56 Additionally, institutions tend not to utilize multiple methods
of assessing adjuncts’ teaching, instead relying solely on student
evaluations.57 These conditions give adjuncts a strong incentive to “grade
to please”; their lack of job security may make them less inclined to
challenge students with unpopular views during class discussion, or to
assign them low grades.58
Numerous studies document how faculty-student interaction promotes
positive learning and student development.59 The more contact students

52. CHILDRESS, supra note 28, at 4.
53. Id. at 21.
54. Roger G. Baldwin & Matthew R. Wawrzynski, Contingent Faculty as Teachers:
What We Know; What We Need to Know, 55(11) AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1485, 1494 (2011).
Learning-centered strategies refers to pedagogies that are more active, collaborative, and
promoting of faculty-student contact. Id. at 1487. The study measured this by defining use
of the following techniques as learning centered: essay (not short answer or multiple
choice) exams, student evaluations of each other’s work, research papers, group projects,
oral presentations, or submitting multiple drafts of written work. Id. at 1492. Differences
in the use of teaching strategies among faculty appointment types were not significant in a
few academic fields, namely accounting and finance. Id. at 1494.
55. Id. at 1494.
56. Id. at 1503–05.
57. Frederickson, supra note 33, at 26–27.
58. Id.
59. KEZAR ET AL., supra note 2, at 111–17.
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have with their faculty, the greater the developmental benefit.60 Although
all faculty-student contact is beneficial, more meaningful contacts made in
an academic context (supervised internships, faculty-moderated
discussions, or capstone experiences, as opposed to informal social
contacts) are particularly important, and can incentivize students to pursue
subsequent valuable opportunities during college.61 Interactions with
faculty are especially important for first generation, underrepresented
minority, and low-income students; faculty interactions incentivize these
students to better engage and work harder.62
Developing meaningful student-faculty relationships is particularly
important during the first year of college, when experiences most strongly
influence student learning and persistence.63 During this time, students are
looking for signals from faculty to guide them. If students’ early
experiences are with faculty who are unable to develop meaningful
contacts with them, students are not as likely to seek out faculty later in
their college careers.64 Yet it is first-year courses that adjunct faculty
typically teach.65 Higher education institutions tend to assign adjuncts to
teach the introductory, freshmen writing, or remedial education courses.66
Tenure-track faculty generally teach more specialized and advanced
courses that serve the majors, leaving lower-level, core courses to the parttime faculty and graduate assistants.67 Based on enrollment records of
thousands of public university students over a four-year period, one study
found that first-year freshmen had taken an average of 48% of their firstsemester coursework from part-time faculty.68
60. George D. Kuh & Shouping Hu, The Effects of Student-Faculty Interaction in the
1990s, 24(3) REV. HIGHER EDUC. 309, 309 (2001) (citing studies).
61. Id. at 329.
62. KEZAR ET AL., supra note 2, at 114.
63. Robert D. Reason et al., Developing Social and Personal Competence in the First
Year of College, 30(3) REV. HIGHER EDUC. 271, 274 (2007). Analyzing National Survey of
Student Engagement data, this study found a statistically significant relationship between
first-year college student perceptions of the supportiveness of their institutional
environment (including relationships with faculty) and students’ social and personal
growth. Id. at 290.
64. KEZAR ET AL., supra note 2, at 100–01.
65. Law schools are the exception to this rule because ABA standards require
substantially all of the first-year curriculum to be taught by full-time faculty. See infra Part
IV.A.
66. Frederickson, supra note 33, at para. 25.
67. CHILDRESS, supra note 28, at 78.
68. CHARLES HARRINGTON & TIMOTHY SCHIBIK, CAVEAT EMPTOR: IS THERE A
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PART-TIME FACULTY UTILIZATION AND STUDENT LEARNING
OUTCOMES AND RETENTION? 9 (2001), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED512352.pdf[htt
ps://web.archive.org/web/20220104163705/https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED512352.pd
f].
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Increased reliance by colleges and universities on part-time faculty has
been found to negatively affect students’ likelihood of graduating
college;69 staying in college past the first year;70 or, in the case of
community college students, transferring to a four-year program.71 At the
same time, part-time faculty (especially older instructors teaching courses
tied to specific occupations, like education or engineering) have been
found to have a modest, positive effect on a student’s likelihood to take
subsequent coursework in the same subject.72 These findings are
consistent with what many experts have concluded—that the problem is
not adjunct faculty’s teaching ability, but rather adjunct employment
conditions.
Over-reliance on adjunct faculty also constrains the capacity of
institutions’ shrinking numbers of full-time faculty, who are left to
shoulder the service work necessary for colleges and universities to fulfill
their educational and research missions and comply with accreditation
standards. An institution’s ability to carry out its academic programs
effectively depends on faculty who assess program-level student outcomes
and monitor student success; administer academic policies; manage,
evaluate, and improve the program’s curriculum; recruit, train, and
evaluate the institution’s faculty (both full-time and adjunct); engage in
public service and research; and participate in shared governance. Because
69. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Liang Zhang, Do Tenured and Tenure-Track Faculty
Matter? 40(3) J. HUM. RES. 647, 654 (2005) (finding a 10% increase in an institution’s
percentage of part-time faculty is associated with a 2.65% reduction in a public institution’s
five- or six-year graduation rate (and a 3% reduction at private institutions)); Daniel
Jacoby, Effects of Part-Time Faculty Employment on Community College Graduation
Rates, 77(6) J. HIGHER EDUC. 1081, 1092–93 (finding a negative, statistically significant
relationship between the percentage of part-time faculty at a community college and the
college’s three-year graduation rate).
70. HARRINGTON & SCHIBIK, supra note 68, at 11 (finding a negative, statistically
significant relationship between first-semester students’ exposure to part-time faculty and
the retention rate of these students in the second semester); Eric P. Bettinger & Bridget T.
Long, The Increasing Use of Adjunct Instructors at Public Institutions: Are We Hurting
Students? in WHAT’S HAPPENING TO PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION 51 (Ronald Ehrenberg ed.,
2006) (“students taking an adjunct-heavy course schedule in their first semester are less
likely to persist into their second year”).
71. M. K. Eagan, Jr. & Audrey J. Jaeger, Effects of Exposure to Part-Time Faculty on
Community College Transfer, 50 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 168, 180 (finding a negative,
statistically significant relationship between students’ exposure to part-time faculty and
their likelihood of transferring to a four-year program). For example, the average student
in the sample had taken almost 40% of their academic credits from part-time faculty; such
a student was 8% less likely to transfer than a student who had taken all of their courses
with full-time faculty. Id.
72. Eric P. Bettinger & Bridget T. Long, Does Cheaper Mean Better? The Impact of
Using Adjunct Instructors on Student Outcomes, 92(3) REV. ECON. & STAT. 598, 611
(2010).
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of the lack of support generally afforded to them (as described above),
adjunct faculty cannot be expected to shoulder this work.
Finally, a college or university’s underinvestment in full-time faculty
undermines academic freedom, an essential feature of higher education
without which “our civilization [would] stagnate and die.”73 Security of
employment is crucial to higher education because it allows faculty the
freedom to teach, conduct research, and participate in institutional
governance without fear of retribution.74 As the U.S Supreme Court
observed, “[s]cholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and
distrust.”75 Similarly, the contingent nature of the employment may
adversely affect adjunct teaching.76 And since there is strength as well as
safety in numbers, the faculty’s ability to make sound and independent
governance decisions is weakened when the share of the institution’s fulltime faculty is small.77
Considering these factors together with the “neoliberal audit culture”78
that has pervaded higher education, one wonders whether academic
careers are still attractive to potential entrants to academia. Hall questions
whether working as a full-time academic is becoming obsolete; graduate
students who in the past may have obtained a tenure-track position are now
finding “there is no longer secure—let alone interesting or satisfying—
employment to be had in higher education.”79 Institutional over-reliance
on adjunct faculty adversely affects the working conditions of full-time
faculty, which over time may inhibit faculty recruitment by shrinking the
pool of interested candidates. The unavailability of secure and rewarding
73. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
74. See generally 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND
TENURE, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS & ASS’N OF AM. COLLS.,
https://www.aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-academic-freedom-and-tenure
[http://web.archive.org/web/20211001000215/https://www.aaup.org/report/1940statement-principles-academic-freedom-and-tenure] (last visited Dec. 28, 2021). Although
the 1940 Statement emphasizes the importance of tenure in promoting and protecting
academic freedom, the Supreme Court has recognized that academic freedom protects all
teachers and students. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250 (referring to the indispensability of
academic freedom to all “teachers and students”).
75. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.
76. See Baldwin & Wawrzynski, supra notes 54–56 and accompanying text.
77. SUSAN RESNICK PIERCE, GOVERNANCE RECONSIDERED: HOW BOARDS, PRESIDENTS,
ADMINISTRATORS, AND FACULTY CAN HELP THEIR COLLEGES THRIVE 46–48 (2014). Higher
education institutions typically limit participation in shared governance to full-time faculty.
Adrianna Kezar & Cecile Sam, Governance as a Catalyst for Policy Change: Creating a
Contingent Faculty Friendly Academy, 28(3) EDUC. POL’Y 425, 427–28 (2014).
78. Hall uses this phrase in reference to the relentless monitoring of performance data
by college and university administrators and the pressure on faculty to achieve high
“customer” (i.e., student) ratings. Hall, supra note 5, at 24–27.
79. Id. at 40.
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faculty positions80 may similarly dampen student interest in pursuing
doctoral degrees, an important source of revenue for many universities.
To summarize, although adjunct faculty can provide a valuable
practical perspective in the classroom, excessive reliance on adjunct
faculty by institutions adversely affects student learning, due to the
inherent nature of the adjunct employment relationship and a general lack
of institutional support for adjuncts. Hiring a critical mass81 of full-time
faculty is also necessary to meet out-of-class responsibilities and
governance needs of an institution. Put another way, over-reliance on parttime faculty indicates a college or university is underinvesting in its most
important asset. But as described in the next section, focusing on an
institution’s faculty resources, or “inputs,” has fallen out of favor among
accreditors.
III. HIGHER EDUCATION ACCREDITATION
Unlike other countries, the U.S. does not have a federal ministry of
education.82 The Tenth Amendment generally reserves to states the power
to regulate education.83 In addition, it is private commissions, not the
80. In 2019, the American Historical Association reported data showing that the
number of academic job openings for PhDs in history had not recovered since it fell
precipitously in 2008. There were twice as many new history PhDs in 2016 as there were
advertised job openings. Dylan Ruediger, The 2019 AHA Jobs Report, PERSP. ON HIST.
(Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-onhistory/february-2019/the-2019-aha-jobs-report-a-closer-look-at-facultyhiring [http://web.archive.org/web/20210811211913/https://www.historians.org/publicati
ons-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/
february-2019/the-2019-aha-jobs-report-a-closer-look-at-faculty-hiring]. Observing that
fewer than half of matriculated students between 2005 and 2010 had obtained tenure-track
positions, a committee at Yale University recently recommended restructuring its doctoral
programs in the humanities. Report of the Humanities Doctoral Education Advisory
Working Group, YALE (Feb. 1, 2021), https://image.message.yale.edu/lib/
fe311570756405787c1278/m/1/0bfeafd2-c069-43b3-b529bd6a7460fb89.pdf [http://web.
archive.org/web/20210929212417/https://image.message.yale.edu/lib/fe31157075640578
7c1278/m/1/0bfeafd2-c069-43b3-b529-bd6a7460fb89.pdf].
81. Hackmann & McCarthy, supra note 50, at 24 (calling for state education
departments, accrediting bodies, and professional associations to define the “critical mass”
of faculty necessary to adequately staff university-based school leadership programs).
82. Judith Areen, Accreditation Reconsidered, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1471, 1493 (2011).
83. The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states, or to the people, powers not otherwise
constitutionally delegated to the federal government. U.S. CONST. amend. X. See also
WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION: A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION MAKING
1535 (5th ed. 2013) (explaining that the Tenth Amendment does not delegate all authority
over education to the states, since many federal constitutional powers are sufficiently broad
to affect education).
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government, that accredit U.S. higher education institutions.84 But as a
practical matter, growing reliance by institutions on federal funds has
given the federal government substantial regulatory authority over higher
education, since the federal government conditions an institution’s access
to funds on its compliance with federal requirements. In particular,
colleges and universities must be accredited by a DOE-recognized entity
as a condition to eligibility for access to student financial aid.85
Although the most commonly stated purpose of accreditation is
quality assurance, it serves other purposes as well. The federal government
emphasizes the objective of accreditation as ensuring accredited
institutions meet an “acceptable” minimum quality standard.86 Other
purposes of accreditation are practical, including, as previously stated,
ensuring student access to federal financial aid. Institutions rely on a
college or university’s accredited status when accepting transfer credits
earned by students at the college or university. Additionally, prospective
employers rely on an institution’s accreditation when evaluating a
student’s academic credentials.87 Accrediting bodies view the purpose of
accreditation as being about institutional improvement as well as quality
assurance.88 ABA accreditation promotes institutional excellence, ensures
attorney competence, and protects “student consumers.”89 Accreditation
standards address different aspects of institutional quality, including
governance; curriculum; faculty; student support; human, financial,
technological, and physical resources; institutional integrity; and
institutional planning.90
84. Areen, supra note 82, at 1494.
85. Id. at 1483 (citing Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, § 435, 79
Stat. 1219, 1247–48 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1001); JUDITH S. EATON, COUNCIL
FOR HIGHER EDUCATION ACCREDITATION, AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. ACCREDITATION 3 (2015).
86. GASTON, supra note 13, at 6.
87. EATON, supra note 85.
88. For example, the New England Commission of Higher Education (NECHE), a
regional accreditor, refers to its role as providing “public assurance about the educational
quality of [the] degree-granting institutions” it accredits. But NECHE also expects the
institutions it accredits to continually try to improve. Standards for Accreditation:
Preamble, NEW ENG. COMM’N OF HIGHER EDUC. (2021), https://www.neche.org/resource
s/standards-for-accreditation#preamble [https://web.archive.org/web/20211009130323/
https://www.neche.org/resources/standards-for-accreditation][hereinafter NECHE
Standards] (last visited Dec. 28, 2021). See also Areen, supra note 82, at 1482–83
(describing how the objective of accreditation is “[q]uality [e]nhancement as [w]ell as
[a]ssurance”).
89. Judith Welch Wegner, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Reflections on the
Accreditation Debate, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 441, 442 (1995).
90. See, e.g., NECHE Standards, supra note 88. The Higher Education Act requires
accrediting standards to address institutions’ success with respect to student achievement,
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In spite of their similar, quality-assurance objectives, the ABA, a
specialized accrediting body, differs from regional accrediting bodies in
significant ways. Regional accrediting bodies (such as NECHE) accredit
a wide variety of institution types, including for-profit, not-for-profit, and
public institutions as well as institutions with diverse missions.91 The
institutions the ABA accredits, although varied, are all law schools.92
Additionally, ABA accreditation only extends to juris doctor (JD)
programs, whereas regional accreditors accredit the entire institution,
including at times large universities offering hundreds of degree
programs.93 Finally, since many states require students to graduate from
an ABA-accredited program as a precondition to sitting for the bar exam,94
the ABA’s accreditation standards have been seen by some as a restraint
on competition in the legal education market.95
A college or university must be recognized by the DOE for its students
to be eligible for federal financial aid; for this reason, maintaining DOE
recognition is of crucial importance to accrediting bodies. Accrediting
bodies are reviewed at least once every five years.96 Since 1992, the DOE
has been supported in its review and recognition of accrediting bodies by
a special advisory committee—the National Advisory Committee on
Institutional Quality and Integrity (NACIQI).97 NACIQI’s membership
comprises individuals who represent all sectors of higher education and
are knowledgeable about higher education accreditation and

curricula, faculty, facilities, fiscal and administrative capacity, and student support
services, among other factors. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(a)(5).
91. To provide a sense of the variety of institutions regional accreditors serve, consider
the institutions listed on NECHE’s roster, including Hartford Seminary, U.S. Coast Guard
Academy, Brown University, Colby College, Berklee College of Music, Conway School
of Landscape Design, University of New Hampshire, Roxbury Community College, and
College Unbound. Roster of Institutions, NECHE, https://www.neche.org/about-neche/allinstitutions/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20210929212513/https://www.neche.org/aboutneche/all-institutions/] (last visited March 7, 2021).
92. See infra note 133.
93. My institution, the University of Illinois Chicago, currently offers over 250 degree
programs, including 86 undergraduate, 110 master’s, and 66 doctoral programs. Programs
of Study, UNIV. OF ILL. AT CHI., https://www.uic.edu/academics/programs-of-study/
[https://web.archive.org/web/20211106032925/https://www.uic.edu/academics/programsof-study/] (last visited March 7, 2021).
94. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 175–6 and accompanying text.
96. Judith S. Eaton, U.S. Accreditation: Meeting the Challenges of Accountability and
Student Achievement, 5 EVALUATION HIGHER EDUC. 1, 7 (2011).
97. Areen, supra note 82, at 1484, n.66.
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administration.98 Of the eighteen members currently serving on NACIQI,
about half are chancellors, presidents, central administrators, or trustees at
higher education institutions.99 NACIQI is charged with various advisory
responsibilities, most importantly advising the Secretary of Education on
whether an accreditor’s recognition should be renewed or not.100
For the past decade or more, accrediting bodies have been accused of
failing to fulfill their basic responsibility—providing assurance to the
public of institutional quality. In 2008, a NACIQI member complained
that accrediting bodies had closed “a mere handful” of institutions in the
preceding 60 years.101 In 2009, the DOE’s inspector general recommended
imposing sanctions on the Higher Learning Commission, a regional
accreditor, for accrediting a for-profit institution with an “egregious”
credit-hour policy.102 In 2016 and again in 2021, NACIQI recommended
that the Secretary of Education derecognize the Accrediting Council for
Independent Colleges and Schools (ACICS), an accreditor of for-profit
institutions (including now-defunct Corinthian Colleges and ITT).103 The
low completion rates and high indebtedness of many students attending
for-profit institutions call into question whether for-profit institutions
should be eligible for federally-subsidized student loans, and whether

98. 20 U.S.C. § 1011c(b)(2). One-third of NACIQI’s members are appointed by the
Secretary of Education, one-third by the Speaker of the House of Representatives (based
on recommendations from both parties), and one-third by the President pro tempore of the
Senate (based on recommendations from both parties). 20 U.S.C. § 1011c(b)(1).
99. Bios, NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. ON INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY & INTEGRITY,
https://sites.ed.gov/naciqi/bios/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20210929212635/https://sites
.ed.gov/naciqi/bios/] (last visited March 7, 2021). One member, Robert Mayes, is CEO of
Columbia Southern Education Group, which owns two for-profit universities. Id.
100. 20 U.S.C. § 1011c(c).
101. Anne D. Neal, Seeking Higher-Ed Accountability: Ending Federal Accreditation,
40 CHANGE: MAG. HIGHER LEARNING 24, 26 (2008).
102. GASTON, supra note 13, at 62.
103. Eric Kelderman, Federal Advisory Panel Votes to Revoke Recognition of Embattled
Accreditor, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.chronicle.com/article/hig
her-ed-under-biden-live-updates?u [https://web.archive.org/web/20211229020404/https://
www.chronicle.com/blogs/higher-ed-under-biden-harris?u] Although then-Secretary of
Education John King withdrew recognition of ACICS in 2016, King’s successor, Betsy
DeVos, later reinstated ACICS as a recognized accrediting body. Erica L. Green, Betsy
DeVos Reinstated College Accreditor Over Staff Objections, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 11, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/us/politics/betsy-devos-for-profit-highereducation.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20211106033221/https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/06/11/us/politics/betsy-devos-for-profit-higher-education.html].For additional
details, see Important Information on the Derecognition of ACICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
https://www.ed.gov/acics [http://web.archive.org/web/20210929212917/https://www.ed.
gov/acics] (last visited Dec. 28, 2021).
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accreditors are able and willing to sanction institutions that fail to serve
their students.104 As Eaton stated in 2016:
Accreditation is now the public’s business. . . . [T]he focus is on
accreditation and whether it is a reliable source of public
accountability. Media attention is on default rates as too high and
graduation rates as too low, on repeated expressions of employer
dissatisfaction with employees’ skills . . . . [T]he public
increasingly questions what accreditation accomplishes and, in
particular, whether it is publicly accountable.105
Eaton’s statement reflects a broad consensus on the need for greater
accountability over accreditors, to ensure at a minimum that students finish
college, find employment, and pay their debts.
In 2005, then-Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings appointed a
high-level commission to develop a strategy and recommendations for
improving U.S. higher education.106 The commission’s report cited data
showing that the U.S. was falling behind other countries in educating its
citizenry through the postsecondary level.107 The report asserted that
higher education must change from a reputation- to performance-based
system, and urged that it develop a culture of accountability and
transparency.108 In particular, higher education accreditors were advised
to “make performance outcomes . . . the core of their assessment as a
priority over inputs or processes.”109 In fact, most regional accreditors had
shifted to outputs-based assessment before the Spellings Commission
issued its report.110 One stated rationale for basing accreditation on outputs
(as opposed to inputs) is that this approach gives colleges and universities
104. See GASTON, supra note 13, at 62–63 for a similar argument.
105. Judith S. Eaton, Pivotal Year for Accreditation, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Dec. 1, 2016),
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2016/12/01/growing-federal-role-accreditationwill-have-drawbacks-essay [http://web.archive.org/web/20210929212957/https://www.
insidehighered.com/views/2016/12/01/growing-federal-role-accreditation-will-havedrawbacks-essay]. At the time of her essay, Eaton was president of the Council for Higher
Education Accreditation, a non-governmental association of colleges and universities that
reviews and recognizes higher education accreditors.
106. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., A TEST OF LEADERSHIP: CHARTING THE FUTURE
OF U.S. HIGHER EDUCATION 33 (2006) [hereinafter Spellings Report], https://files.eric.
ed.gov/fulltext/ED493504.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20211229022843/https://
files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED493504.pdf].
107. Id. at 13 (citing 2005 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
data).
108. Id. at 21.
109. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
110. GASTON, supra note 13, at 122.
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the autonomy to “determine how best to use their resources and what
personnel . . . are needed to achieve student learning outcomes.”111 On a
political level, public demands for accreditor accountability are reflected
in proposed higher education reform bills, including proposals that would
further focus accreditation on student achievement. As Eaton observed,
“from a federal perspective, ‘quality’ is now about higher graduation rates,
less student debt and default, better jobs, and decent earnings.”112
This shift of focus from inputs to outcomes led accrediting bodies to
adopt more flexible (i.e., less specific) full-time faculty requirements. In
the early 2000’s, the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology
(ABET), a specialized accreditor, reoriented the focus of its standards
from measuring inputs to student outcomes assessment. ABET eliminated
an existing minimum full-time faculty requirement from its standards.113
Currently, the faculty criterion in ABET’s accreditation standards for
engineering programs requires only that the faculty be “of sufficient
number . . . to cover all the curricular areas of the program” and “to
accommodate adequate levels of student-faculty interaction . . . .”114
Although ABET’s standards require that the faculty have “appropriate
qualifications” and “sufficient authority” to implement the educational
program,115 the standards do not specify that faculty must have security of
position or even that they must be employed on a full-time basis.
In contrast, the ABA’s full-time faculty requirements (described in the
next section) are relatively specific, prescriptive, and input-focused. As
noted, focusing less on inputs and more on student outcomes gives higher
education institutions autonomy to allocate resources as they see fit, as
long as the outcomes are met. But outcomes data should be interpreted
with care, as there are factors that influence student outcomes that have
little to do with institutional quality.116 Holding colleges and universities
111. Id. at 167 (quoting the Council for Higher Education Accreditation).
112. Eaton, supra note 105.
113. See Whymeyer v. Dept. of State, 997 A.2d 1254, 1256–57 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010)
(describing ABET’s shift in approach); Sinha v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., No. 98-C-7275
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12306, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2001) (referencing ABET’s
previous minimum faculty requirement).
114. ABET ENGINEERING ACCREDITATION COMMISSION, CRITERIA FOR ACCREDITING
ENGINEERING PROGRAMS Criterion 6 (2019) [hereinafter ABET Criteria].
115. Id.
116. For example, a low proportion of community college students incur federal student
loan debt. For this reason, the cohort default rate for community college students can be
artificially high, even where the average amount and rate of student borrowing for the
institution is low. In 2009, one community college had a cohort default rate of 50% because
the cohort only included two student borrowers and one defaulter. Advisory Committee on
Student Financial Assistance, Hearing Transcript: Postsecondary Institution Ratings
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accountable for student outcomes may also unfairly penalize institutions
that serve under-privileged groups.117 Finally, as addressed in Part IV.A,
by revising its standards to focus less on inputs, ABET has made its fulltime faculty sufficiency requirement rather opaque and difficult to
measure. The ABA’s approach—maintaining a specific full-time faculty
requirement (in addition to holding institutions accountable for outcomes
like attrition118 and bar passage119)—promotes transparency as well as
institutional accountability regarding faculty adequacy. As a clear rule, the
ABA’s current requirement (Standard 403) is relatively straightforward to
measure, facilitating compliance and promoting transparency regarding an
institution’s investment in faculty resources.
But as the ABA’s experience has shown,120 the federal government—
both the DOJ’s antitrust division and more recently the DOE and
NACIQI—have pressured the ABA Council to relax its full-time faculty
requirements, not vigorously enforce or strengthen them. The next section
discusses the evolution of the ABA’s full-time faculty standards and its
shifting enforcement of those standards in response to government
pressure.

System (2014) 48 [hereinafter PIRS Hearing,] (on file with author) (testimony of Jee Hang
Lee). Similarly, a college may graduate 75% of its students, but it is impossible to
determine from that factor alone whether the institution has a quality educational program;
the institution “could just be awarding a ton of nine-month certificates.” Id. at 11
(testimony of Ben Miller).
117. Ideally, student outcomes assessment should be adjusted to account for the
resources and academic experience of the incoming students. Community colleges and
institutions that serve underrepresented minority groups play a significant role in providing
educational access to low-income and nontraditional students, students who likely will not
graduate at the same rate or earn as much after graduation as other students. Id. PIRS
hearing, at 42–43 (testimony of Jesse O’Connell).
118. The ABA requires law schools to report and publicly disclose attrition data, broken
down between academic attrition and student transfers. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, STANDARDS AND RULES OF
PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, Standard 509(b)(4) (2019–2020) [hereinafter
ABA Standards]. An excessive academic attrition rate is evidence that an institution is not
meeting other ABA standards. Id. Interpretation 501-3 (academic attrition rate above 20%
creates a rebuttable presumption that a school is not in compliance).
Unless otherwise indicated, reference to the ABA Standards is to the 2020–2021
version. Current and past versions of the ABA Standards are available on the website of
the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, at
www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/standards/standards_archives/
[http://web.archive.org/web/20210929213556/https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal
_education/resources/standards/standards_archives/] (last visited Mar. 23, 2021).
119. ABA Standard 316 requires at least 75% of a law school’s graduates who sat for a
bar exam to pass the exam within two years of graduation. ABA Standards, supra note 118.
120. See infra Part IV.B.
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IV. ABA FULL-TIME FACULTY REQUIREMENTS
Maintaining ABA accreditation is very important to law schools.
Accreditation plants the imprimatur of the ABA on the institution.
Additionally, most states either limit eligibility to take the bar exam to
graduates of ABA-accredited law schools or impose onerous eligibility
requirements on graduates of non-ABA-accredited schools.121 Finally, the
DOE recognizes the ABA Council as an accrediting agency,122 which
matters for those independent law schools that are not regionally
accredited and thus rely on ABA accreditation as a precondition to
eligibility for federal student financial aid.123
In contrast with other accrediting bodies, the ABA’s accreditation
standards are unique in their specificity and clarity regarding full-time
faculty requirements. NACIQI has criticized the ABA Council for
focusing on inputs like faculty resources.124 In 1996, the ABA settled
federal antitrust charges from the DOJ by entering into a consent decree
that subjected the ABA to ten years of federal oversight of its accreditation
practices, including full-time faculty requirements. Because of this
pressure, it is unlikely today that the ABA would withhold or revoke a law
school’s accreditation based solely on the school’s non-compliance with
full-time faculty requirements (although it might do so if there was also
evidence of low bar passage rates or other poor student outcomes).
This section discusses the evolution of the ABA’s full-time faculty
regulations and their enforcement. It first addresses the ABA standards
regulating full-time faculty size and the portion of the curriculum to be
121. As of 2020, nineteen states limit eligibility to take the bar exam to graduates of
ABA-accredited law schools. An additional twenty states allow graduates of non-ABAaccredited, out-of-state law schools to sit for the bar only if they have practiced law for at
least three years (many states require longer periods). Missouri and the District of
Columbia allow graduates of out-of-state, non-ABA-accredited schools to sit for the bar if
they have completed twenty-four (Missouri) or twenty-six (District of Columbia) semester
hours of study at an ABA-accredited school. Washington requires graduates of non-ABAaccredited schools (whether in-state or out-of-state) to complete an LLM degree at an
ABA-accredited school. Six states (Alabama, California, Massachusetts, Tennessee,
Washington, and West Virginia) allow graduates of non-ABA-accredited, in-state schools
to sit for the bar exam. Maine and New Hampshire allow graduates of Massachusetts
School of Law to sit for the bar if they are admitted to the Massachusetts bar. NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS & ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS
TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 9–12 (2020).
122. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
123. Independent law schools that are ABA, but not regionally, accredited include:
Appalachian School of Law; Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School; Ave Maria School of
Law; Brooklyn Law School; Charleston School of Law; Florida Coastal School of Law;
and New York Law School.
124. See infra notes 200–12 and accompanying text.
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taught by full-time faculty. It then shows how the ABA, in response to
pressure from the federal government, shifted the focus of its enforcement
efforts away from compliance with full-time faculty requirements.
A. Standards on Full-Time Faculty Size and Instructional Role
The DOE first recognized the ABA Council as an accrediting agency
in 1952.125 The ABA Council regulates law schools’ use of adjunct faculty
through its standards on faculty size (Standard 402) and the share of the
curriculum to be taught by full-time faculty (Standard 403).126 These
standards have remained relatively consistent, but with a few revisions
over the decades.
ABA Standards 402 and 403 were adopted almost 50 years ago, as
part of a major revision of the standards undertaken in the early 1970s.127
The 1973 versions of Standards 402 and 403 read as follows:
Standard 402
(a) The law school shall have not fewer than six full-time faculty
members, in addition to a full-time dean and a law librarian. It
shall have such additional members as are necessary to fulfill the
requirements of this Chapter and the needs of its educational
program, with due consideration for

125. ABA Standards, supra note 118, Preface, at v.
126. ABA Standards, supra note 118, at Standards 402 and 403. The ABA Standards
also govern tenure, academic freedom, and security of position for full-time faculty.
Standard 405(b) requires law schools to establish policies on academic freedom and tenure,
405(c) requires them to afford security of position “reasonably similar” to tenure for
clinical faculty, and 405(d) requires them to afford security of position for legal writing
instructors. The history and implications of Standard 405 have been addressed extensively
in the literature. See, e.g., Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, On Writing Wrongs: Legal Writing
Professors and the Curious Case of 405(c), 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 575 (2017); Donald J.
Polden & Joseph P. Tomain, Standard 405 and Terms and Conditions of Employment:
More Chaos, Conflict, and Confusion Ahead, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 634 (2017); Peter A. Joy,
ABA Standard 405(c): Two Steps Forward and One Step Back for Legal Education, 66 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 606 (2017); Kathryn M. Stanchi & Jan M. Levine, Gender and Legal
Writing: Law School’s Dirty Little Secrets, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L. J. 3 (2001); Melissa
H. Weresh, Stars upon Thars: Evaluating the Discriminatory Impact of ABA Standard
405(c), 34 LAW & INEQ. 137 (2016); Peter A. Joy & Robert R. Kuehn, The Evolution of
ABA Standards for Clinical Faculty, 75 TENN. L. REV. 183 (2008). The JOURNAL OF LEGAL
EDUCATION devoted its Spring 2017 issue to ABA Standard 405(c).
127. ABA Standards, supra note 118, Preface at vi.
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(i) the size of the student body and the opportunity for
students to meet with and consult faculty members on an
individual basis,
(ii) the nature and scope of the educational program, and
(iii) adequate opportunity for effective participation by
faculty in the governance of the law school.
(b) A full-time faculty member is one who during the academic
year devotes substantially all his working time to teaching and
legal scholarship, has no outside office or business activities and
whose outside professional activities, if any, are limited to those
which relate to his major academic interests or enrich his capacity
as scholar and teacher, or are of service to the public generally,
and do not unduly interfere with his responsibilities as a faculty
member.
Standard 403
The major burden of the educational program and the major
responsibility for faculty participation in the governance of the
law school rests upon the full-time faculty members.
(a) Students shall receive substantially all of their
instruction in the first year of the full-time curriculum or
the first two years of the part-time curriculum, and a major
proportion of their total instruction from full-time faculty
members. . . .128
The 1973 version prescribed a minimum number of full-time faculty129
and was interpreted to hold law schools to a maximum student-to-fulltime-faculty ratio.130
128. ABA Standards [1973 version], supra note 118, Standards 402–403. Standard
403(c) used to state that a law school “should include experienced lawyers and judges as
teaching resources” in the school’s program. This provision was removed in 2014.
129. From 1973 until the requirement was removed in 2005, Standard 402 required law
schools to have at least six full-time faculty, in addition to a full-time dean and law
librarian. ABA Standards [1973 version], supra note 118, Standard 402(a).
130. The ABA’s Council and Accreditation Committee historically looked to studentto-faculty ratios when considering compliance with faculty sufficiency standards; a law
school with an excessive ratio of students to full-time faculty (for example, a ratio of over
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Almost 50 years later, Standards 402 and 403 remain remarkably
similar. The definition of “full-time faculty member” is now in the
definitions section, but at its core still defines full-time faculty as someone
who devotes substantially all of their working time during the academic
year to their teaching, service, and research responsibilities.131 Current
ABA standards do not require a minimum number or ratio of full-time
faculty,132 but they still require most of the JD curriculum, including all
first-year courses, to be taught by full-time faculty.133 Perhaps the most
significant drafting change—adding to Standard 403 the requirement that
full-time faculty must teach more than half of all credit hours offered by
the law school—was not new, but re-introduced a requirement that had
existed in the standards (albeit in stricter form) before 1973.134 What has
changed over time is the strictness with which the ABA Council interprets
and enforces Standard 402. From the 1970s until 1996, the ABA
interpreted the standards to require institutions to maintain what in its
estimation was a sufficiently low student to full-time faculty ratio to
support a sound educational program.
Since the 1920s, the ABA Council has developed written
interpretations of its standards, giving law schools an idea of how the
30:1) was presumptively out of compliance with the ABA Standards. Thomas L. Schaffer,
Four Issues in the Accreditation of Law Schools, 59 WASH. U. L. Q. 887, 891–94 (1981).
As discussed in Part IV.B, the ABA later revised its interpretations to allow inclusion of
part-time faculty in the calculation of the ratio, and eventually eliminated the ratio
requirement.
131. The standards currently define “full-time faculty member” as:
[A]n individual whose primary professional employment is with the law school,
who is designated by the law school as a full-time faculty member, who devotes
substantially all working time during the academic year to [teaching, academic
advising, scholarship, and service], and whose outside professional activities . .
. do not unduly interfere with his or her responsibilities as a full-time faculty
member. ABA Standards, supra note 118, Definition 9.
132. Current Standard 402 requires law schools to hire a “sufficient number of full-time
faculty to operate in compliance with the standards and carry out its program of legal
instruction.” See ABA Standards, supra note 118, Standard 402.
133. Standard 403(a) requires full-time faculty to teach “substantially all” of the firstyear curriculum, and over half of all credit hours offered. ABA Standards, supra note 118,
Standard 403(a). The ABA is not recognized by the DOE to accredit masters’ programs in
law such as the LLM. Therefore, the ABA acquiesces to regulate degree programs other
than the JD (the principal requirement being that other programs do not interfere with the
institution’s ability to carry out its JD program). See ABA Standards, supra note 118,
Standard 313.
134. The 1969 version of the ABA Standards required “at least 66 2/3 per cent of the
total hours of instruction offered” by a law school to be taught by full-time faculty. ABA
Standards [1969 version], supra note 118, Standard VII.
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Council would enforce the standards during accreditation reviews.135 In
effect, the ABA’s interpretations were “treated as extensions” of the actual
standards.136 Recognizing the de facto binding nature of the
interpretations, a 1996 consent decree between the ABA and the DOJ137
required the ABA to subject proposed interpretations to the same public
comment and review process applicable to proposed standards, and to
publish proposed interpretations in ABA publications.138
In 1978, the ABA Council and Accreditation Committee issued a
detailed interpretation outlining the rationale for a student-faculty ratio
requirement and explaining how the ratio would be calculated and applied
when determining an institution’s compliance with the ABA’s full-time
faculty requirements.139 The interpretation cited a significant increase in
the ratio of students to full-time faculty in legal education during the 1970s
and listed the negative effects of this increase on educational quality—
observed effects that are consistent with the research findings discussed in
Part II.B.140 The committee concluded that the size of an institution’s fulltime faculty in relation to its student body significantly affects its ability
to establish and maintain a sound educational program.141 A law school
with a student to full-time faculty ratio of 30:1 or higher was declared to
be presumptively out of compliance with the ABA Standards.142 Only
tenure-system faculty or faculty with “security of position reasonably
similar to tenure” (professional skills faculty on a separate tenure track or
faculty with renewable long-term contracts) were to be included when
calculating the ratio.143

135. Theodora Belniak, The History of the American Bar Association Accreditation
Standards for Academic Law Libraries, 106 L. LIB. J. 151, 157 (2014).
136. Id. at 158.
137. See infra notes 182–190 and accompanying text.
138. United States v. American Bar Ass’n, 934 F. Supp. 435, 437 (D.D.C. 1996). Even
before the 1996 consent decree, ABA interpretations had been periodically compiled and
published, but after 1996 they became a more formal component of the standards. Belniak,
supra note 135, at 166.
139. Schaffer, supra note 130, at 891–92. The text of the interpretation, titled
Interpretation of Standards 201 and 401–405 [hereinafter 1978 Interpretation], is
published in ABA Standards [1989 version], supra note 118.
140. These effects included: students spending significant time in large-group classes,
with less opportunity to benefit from collaboration or develop rapport with the teacher; less
time for faculty to prepare materials or develop innovative teaching methods; less personal
contact between students and faculty; increased “entropy” in the examination process; less
time for faculty to think, write, or engage in public service; and less participation by faculty
in shared governance. 1978 Interpretation, supra note 139, at 4–8.
141. Id. at 9.
142. Id. at 10.
143. Id.

2022]

DEREGULATION AND THE 'GIG ACADEMY'

177

As discussed in the next section, the ABA’s detailed and demanding
accreditation process subjected it to legal challenges and public criticism
during the 1990s. Among the most vocal critics were law school deans,
who published an open letter in 1994, describing the ABA accreditation
process as overly costly, inflexible, and intrusive.144 But law school deans
at the time also acknowledged the value of the ABA’s full-time faculty
requirements. An author of the 1994 letter conceded the merit of an
accreditation process whose function is to ensure “minimum standards of
instructional competence” in legal education.145 Another dean emphasized
his support of the student-faculty ratio requirement:
I am the dean of a large dual-division school, and it is deans of
such schools that tend to be most vocal in criticism of the ABA
presumptions concerning student/faculty ratios. I have never
understood the rational (as opposed to self-interested) basis for my
colleagues’ criticism. . . . [I]t would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, for us to offer a quality modern legal education with
a ratio higher than 30:1.146
Writing in 2001, yet another dean touted the requirement as
contributing more than any other accreditation measure in recent decades
to improving the quality of legal education in the U.S., characterizing it as
a “red flag” for inspection teams regarding the sufficiency of an
institution’s educational resources.147 In short, the educational justification
for the ABA’s student to full-time faculty ratio requirement was
incontrovertible; as one commentator put it, it was “controversial less on
educational grounds than on fiscal grounds.”148
In 1996, the ABA entered a consent decree with the DOJ that required
it to establish a special commission to review and revise its standards,
including “calculation of the faculty component” of the student-faculty
ratio requirement.149 Concurrent with the commission’s review, the ABA
adopted Interpretations 402-1 and 402-2 on the student-faculty ratio.
144. Robert W. Bennett, Reflections on the Law School Accreditation Process, 30 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 379, 379 n.1 (1995). At the time of his essay, Bennett was Dean of
Northwestern University School of Law.
145. Id. at 379.
146. John A. Sebert, Modest Proposals to Improve and Preserve the Law School
Accreditation Process, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 431, 434 (1995). At the time of his essay, Sebert
was Dean of University of Baltimore School of Law.
147. Robert K. Walsh, The ABA’s Standards for the Accreditation of Law Schools, 51 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 427, 429 (2001). At the time of his essay, Walsh was Dean of Wake Forest
University School of Law.
148. Schaffer, supra note 130, at 894.
149. United States v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 934 F. Supp. 435, 437–38 (D.D.C. 1996).
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Interpretation 402-1 loosened the definition of faculty for purposes of the
ratio to allow inclusion of “additional teaching resources”—adjunct
faculty, non-tenure-track administrators who teach, librarian faculty, and
tenure-system faculty who are also administrators—in the calculation of
up to 20% of the ratio.150 Individuals who fell within the category of
“additional teaching resources” were included in the ratio as a fraction of
a full-time faculty member—0.2 in the case of adjunct faculty.151
So recalculated, the student-faculty ratio became a somewhat
meaningless number; in 2014, the ABA eliminated the ratio requirement
by deleting Interpretations 402-1 and 402-2.152 As the Standards Review
Committee explained, including “additional teaching resources” in the
student-faculty ratio significantly complicated its calculation and
generated controversy over definitional issues, while significantly
lowering ratios across schools.153 The committee cited a report in which
virtually all ABA-accredited law schools had ratios of 30:1 or lower and
the vast majority had ratios of 20:1 or lower.154 The recalculated ratio did
not correlate with typical first-year class sizes, nor was it a meaningful
piece of consumer information for prospective students.155 Other factors,
such as the share of a program’s credit hours taught by full-time faculty,
were cited as more indicative of faculty adequacy than the recalculated
student-faculty ratio.156
Concurrently with eliminating the student-faculty ratio requirement,
the ABA strengthened the language of Standard 403, on the instructional
role of faculty. Both changes emerged from the ABA’s comprehensive
review of the standards during 2008–14. Standard 403 was revised by
adding language specifying that “more than half of all credit hours”
offered by a law school must be taught by its full-time faculty. As revised,
Standard 403(a) reads in full:

150. ABA Standards [1996 version], supra note 118, Interpretation 402-1.
151. Id. Other accrediting bodies, as well as the IPEDS survey, similarly count adjunct
faculty as a fraction of full-time faculty for purposes of calculating an institution’s studentfaculty ratio. Childress refers to this practice as “academia’s own version of the ThreeFifths Compromise.” CHILDRESS, supra note 28, at 24.
152. Compare ABA Standards [2013–14 version], supra note 118, Interpretation 402-1
and 402-2, with ABA Standards [2014–15 version], supra note 118.
153. Hulett H. Askew & Donald J. Polden, Memorandum on Proposed Deletion of
Interpretations 402-1 and 402-2 of the ABA Standards for the Approval of Law Schools,
(Nov. 2008), https://taxprof.typepad.com/files/interpretation-402-1-402-2.pdf [https://
web.archive.org/web/20211001003412/https://taxprof.typepad.com/files/interpretation402-1-402-2.pdf].
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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The full-time faculty shall teach substantially all of the first onethird of each student’s coursework. The full-time faculty shall also
teach during the academic year either (1) more than half of all
credit hours actually offered by the law school, or (2) two-thirds
of the student contact hours generated by student enrollment at the
law school.157
The Standards Review Committee characterized the revision as one
that “clarifies” the then-existing standard, which had required full-time
faculty to teach “the major portion of” a law school’s curriculum.158 But
the change was significant, as discussed below.159 Indeed, the ABA
proposed retracting this revision to Standard 403 just a few years after it
was adopted.
In March 2017, the ABA Council posted for notice and comment a
proposal to revise Standard 403(a) to remove the second sentence, leaving
only the requirement that full-time faculty teach substantially all of the
first-year curriculum. The Council explained that this change would allow
schools “more opportunity to innovate” and create course schedules
suiting “the variety of full-time and part-time teaching resources”

157. ABA Standards, supra note 118, Standard 403(a). The second alternative permits
a law school to satisfy Standard 403(a) by reference to student contact hours instead of
credit hours, presumably because the standards allow a credit hour to be awarded either for
an hour of faculty instruction in a traditional course or for an equivalent amount of student
work (an amount to be determined by the institution’s written policies) completed in an
externship, clinical, or similar experiential course or activity. See ABA Standards, supra
note 118, Standard 310. Since the ABA does not regulate programs other than the JD
program, see supra note 133, the reference to credit hours “actually offered by the law
school” in Standard 403(a) refers only to courses offered in the JD program.
158. ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Comprehensive
Review of the ABA Standards for Approval of Law School Matters for Notice and Comment
(Sept. 6, 2013), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_educ
ation_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/20130906_notice_co
mment_chs_1_3_4_s203b_s603d.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20211106162716/http
s://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissio
ns_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/20130906_notice_comment_chs_1_3_4_
s203b_s603d.pdf] (last visited Feb. 22, 2021).
159. See infra Part V.A.

180

WAYNE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:151

available to them.160 The Council also observed that counting the number
of credit hours taught by full-time faculty “is more of an input measure.”161
The ABA’s proposal to weaken Standard 403(a) provoked a strong,
almost universally negative, reaction from public stakeholders. A law
school dean wrote in support of the proposal.162 Thirteen individual and
group stakeholders—including the Association of American Law Schools
(AALS), the Society of American Law Teachers (SALT), the Clinical
Legal Education Association (CLEA), the Association of Legal Writing
Directors, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP),
and the ABA Dispute Resolution Section—submitted statements against
the proposal.163 Some of the comments in opposition took issue with the
ABA Council’s claim that the revision would promote innovation in legal
education; as the AALS statement put it, “not everything that is less
expensive should be considered an ‘innovation.’”164 SALT observed how
160. Gregory G. Murphy & Barry A. Currier, ABA Standards for Approval of Law
Schools Matters for Notice and Comment, 2–3 (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the
_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/20170324_notice_and_comment_memo.pdf [https:
//web.archive.org/web/20211106162757/https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/a
dministrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutio
ns/20170324_notice_and_comment_memo.pdf] (last visited Feb. 22, 2021).
161. Id. at 3.
162. David Yassky, Proposed Changes to ABA Standards 403(a) and 503 (July 7, 2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admi
ssions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/comments/2017_comment_s403_and
_s503_david_yassky.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20211106162905/https://www.am
ericanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_b
ar/council_reports_and_resolutions/comments/2017_comment_s403_and_s503_david_ya
ssky.pdf]. At the time of his statement, Yassky was Dean of Pace University School of
Law.
163. Links to the public statements submitted in response to the proposal are available
on the ABA Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar’s notice and comment
archive page at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/notice_an
d_comment/notice_comment_archive/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20210416095301/htt
ps://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/notice_and_comment/notice
_comment_archive/] (last visited Feb. 22, 2021).
164. Ass’n of L. Schs., Comment by the Association of American Law Schools on
Proposed Revision to ABA Standard 403(a), A.B.A, https://www.americanbar.org/conten
t/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_a
nd_resolutions/comments/20170728_comment_s403_aals.pdf [https://web.archive.org/w
eb/20211004045829/https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_
education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/comments/2017
0728_comment_s403_aals.pdf] (last visited Dec. 29, 2021); see also Barnhizer, et al.,
Comment on Proposed Revision to Standard 403 (July 10, 2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admi
ssions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/comments/2017_comment_s403_prof
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excessive reliance on adjunct faculty would deprive law schools of the
full-time faculty resources needed to properly support, evaluate, and
mentor those adjunct faculty.165 One statement emphasized the
disproportionately negative impact the proposed change would have on
students of color and the communities they serve.166 In addition to the
written comments, representatives of SALT and CLEA publicly testified
against the proposal.167 In light of the strongly negative public response to
the proposal, the Council eventually withdrew it.168
To summarize, the ABA no longer interprets its standard on full-time
faculty size by requiring institutions to maintain a minimum student to
full-time faculty ratio. Its interpretation on student-faculty ratios was
relaxed in response to the consent decree the ABA entered into with the
DOJ, as discussed in the next section. Although the ABA does not interpret
its standards to require a minimum student-faculty ratio, the standards
retain bright-line requirements with respect to the full-time faculty’s
central role in instruction, requirements that make the ABA something of
an outlier in comparison with other accrediting bodies.

essors_barnhizer_candeub_kuykendall_lawton.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/2021100
4051611/https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_a
nd_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/comments/2017_comment_s
403_professors_barnhizer_candeub_kuykendall_lawton.pdf] (“Innovation occurs when
faculty members have a long-term commitment to an institution.”).
165. Soc’y of Am. L. Tchrs., Comments on Proposed Revisions to Standard 403 (Jul. 9,
2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and
_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/comments/2017_comment_s40
3_salt.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20211004052545/https://www.americanbar.org/c
ontent/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_repo
rts_and_resolutions/comments/2017_comment_s403_salt.pdf].
166. Theodore P. Seto, Comments on Proposed Revisions to Standard 403(a) (July 10,
2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and
_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/comments/2017_comment_s40
3_theodore_seto.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20211004052729/https://www.america
nbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/co
uncil_reports_and_resolutions/comments/2017_comment_s403_theodore_seto.pdf].
167. Public Hearing: Amendments to Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval
of Law Schools, A.B.A., at 12, 24 (July 13, 2017) https://www.americanbar.org/content/d
am/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and
_resolutions/comments/20170713_stds_403a_503_hearing_transcript.pdf [https://web.arc
hive.org/web/20200802104940/https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administra
tive/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/council_reports_and_resolutions/comm
ents/20170713_stds_403a_503_hearing_transcript.pdf].
168. ABA, 49 SYLLABUS [ix] (2018).
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To be sure, the ABA’s strict faculty requirements have an elitist
history.169 In 1929, the chair of the ABA’s Section on Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar declared the ABA’s most important responsibility
to be educating the public of the need to eliminate “commercialized” law
schools, institutions that historically were relatively accessible to
applicants from marginalized groups.170 For decades the ABA Standards
prohibited law schools from operating “for private profit.”171 Responding
to the DOJ’s antitrust investigation and to other critics, the ABA has since
revised its standards to ensure they do not unreasonably restrict
competition in the legal education market. Additionally, as addressed in
the next section, the ABA relaxed interpretation and enforcement of its
full-time faculty requirements in response to pressure from the DOJ and,
more recently, NACIQI.
B. Federal Pressure and Its Effect on ABA Enforcement
In 1995, the then-president of the AALS noted “an explosion of
interest” in law school accreditation.172 Law school deans publicly
criticized the ABA’s detailed and demanding accreditation standards.173 A
panel of college and university presidents developed a plan for
accreditation reform, including strategies to limit the power of specialized
accreditors like the ABA.174 Most significantly, an antitrust lawsuit filed
against the ABA by the Massachusetts School of Law (MSL) prompted
the DOJ to investigate whether the ABA’s accreditation practices violated
the Sherman Act.175
For decades the ABA had denied accreditation or imposed sanctions
on law schools for noncompliance with its full-time faculty
169. At the turn of the 20th century, as increasing numbers of ethnic minority and lowincome students enrolled in night schools to study law, many argued for law schools to
adopt more rigorous admission standards. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE:
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 94–99 (1976). As Auerbach
observed, advocates for higher standards used them “as a weapon . . . to beat back the flow
of newcomers to the profession from ethnic minority groups.” Id. at 99.
170. Donna Fossum, Law School Accreditation Standards and the Structure of American
Legal Education, 31 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 515, 526 (1978).
171. Id. at 529 (quoting ABA Standards [1973 version], Standard 202). Pre–1973, the
standards stated that an independent law school bore the burden of demonstrating that it
did not operate “as a commercial enterprise.” ABA Standards [1969 version], Standard I.B.
172. Wegner, supra note 89, at 441.
173. See supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text. See also John A. Sebert, ABA
Accreditation Standards and Quality Legal Education, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 395, 396
(2007) (referring to significant criticism of the ABA Standards during the 1990s, on
grounds that they were too prescriptive and stifled innovation).
174. Wegner, supra note 89, at 441.
175. Lao, supra note 13, at 1037, n.11.
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requirements.176 MSL, an independent law school whose mission was to
make law school more affordable and accessible by relying extensively on
“expert adjunct professors,”177 was one such institution. Lack of full-time
faculty was a significant factor behind the ABA’s denial of MSL’s
application for provisional accreditation in 1993. The ABA cited eleven
reasons for denying MSL’s application, including the institution’s high
student-faculty ratio and its heavy reliance on adjunct faculty.178 Several
months later, MSL filed a complaint against the ABA, the AALS, the Law
School Admission Council, and a group of individual defendants. MSL
asserted that the defendants, through enforcement of the ABA’s allegedly
anticompetitive accreditation standards, had engaged in monopolistic
conduct in violation of the Sherman Act.179 Among the standards MSL
cited as anticompetitive were Standard 403 and the ABA’s interpretation
on student-faculty ratios.180 Although MSL’s legal challenges were
ultimately unsuccessful, they entangled the ABA in years of litigation.181
MSL’s antitrust complaint prompted the DOJ to conduct its own
investigation. In 1995, the DOJ filed a civil antitrust complaint against the
ABA, claiming that “legal educators had captured the ABA law school
176. See, e.g., Plechner v. Widener College, Inc., 569 F.2d 1250, 1254–55 (3d Cir. 1977)
(regarding ABA site teams visiting Delaware Law School in 1974 and 1975 and
recommending against accreditation, in part due to a lack of full-time faculty); Audain v.
Am Univ., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23623, *3 (D.D.C. 1998) (discussing the probation of
American University’s College of Law because of high student-faculty ratio). In some
cases, institutions did not even apply for accreditation since they had no prospect of being
approved. See, e.g., In re Laclede Sch. of L., 700 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Mo. 1985) (discussing
how non-accredited law school had no full-time faculty members).
177. Mass. Sch. of L. v. Am. Bar Ass’n, No. 95-CV-12320-MEL 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7033, at *3 (D. Mass. May 8, 1997) (quoting Complaint at 22).
178. Id. at *5. In addition to the high student-faculty ratio and heavy reliance on adjunct
faculty, the ABA also cited the heavy teaching loads of MSL’s full-time faculty and MSL’s
failure to give its faculty reasonable opportunities for leaves of absence. Id. As the site
team report observed, “[s]tudents will have much of their course work with instructors who
are part-time, or adjuncts who are not regularly in the building throughout the day, who all
share a single office, and who are not available at the school most of the week.” Id. at *6,
n.2. Only six of MSL’s faculty met the ABA definition of full-time faculty, serving a
student body with 293 full-time and 515 part-time students. Id.
179. Mass. Sch. of L., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7033 at *33.
180. See id. at *46.
181. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s summary judgment for the
defendants in 1997. Id. at *61–62. While appeal of its antitrust claims was still pending in
the Third Circuit, MSL sued the ABA in Massachusetts state court, alleging that the ABA’s
denial of its application for a variance from the standards was fraudulent and in breach of
contract. Mass. Sch. of L., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7033 at *32. The ABA removed the case
to federal court and the District Court dismissed MSL’s claims. When affirming, the First
Circuit characterized the “gargantuan” record in the MSL litigation as “capable of inducing
taphephobia in even the hardiest appellate panel.” Id. at *29.
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accreditation process.”182 The anticompetitive practices alleged in the
complaint included the ABA’s salary requirements for law faculty and
staff,183 its limits on teaching loads,184 and its prohibition on for-profit law
schools.185 The complaint also challenged the ABA’s maximum studentfaculty ratio requirement, emphasizing how calculation of the ratio was
limited to full-time faculty and excluded, among others, adjunct
professors.186 Although the complaint acknowledged the rationale for the
ratio was to ensure adequate contact between students and faculty, the DOJ
alleged that the ABA did not consider it when enforcing the
requirement.187
With the acquiescence of the ABA Board of Governors, the DOJ filed
a proposed consent decree to settle its claims very shortly after it filed the
complaint.188 The final decree required the ABA to change some of the
practices listed in the DOJ’s complaint, such as monitoring salaries and
prohibiting for-profit law schools, and limited the percentage of law school
deans or faculty who could serve on the ABA Council or its committees.189
The decree required the ABA to establish a commission to review the
ABA Standards, including in particular the faculty component of the
student-faculty ratio requirement, to determine whether the standards or
its interpretations should be revised.190 Concurrent with the commission’s
review, the ABA adopted Interpretation 402-1, which relaxed the
requirements for calculating the ratio.191 Finally, the decree required the
ABA to appoint an independent (non-educator) consultant to validate all
ABA Standards and Interpretations as well as a compliance officer to
monitor ABA accrediting activities and ensure compliance with the
decree.192

182. Wegner, supra note 89, at 443 (quoting Complaint at 4, United States v. Am. Bar
Ass’n, 934 F. Supp. 435 (1996) (No. 95-1211) [hereinafter Complaint].
183. Complaint, supra note 182, at 5–6.
184. Id. at 8.
185. Id. at 6.
186. Id. at 7–8.
187. Id. at 8.
188. Wegner, supra note 89, at 442. News of the proposed consent decree and the Board
of Governors’ acquiescence to it prompted two leading members of the ABA Council to
resign in protest. Id. at 442 n.6.
189. United States v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 934 F. Supp. 435, 436–37 (1996); Areen, supra
note 82, at 1487.
190. Am. Bar Ass’n, 934 F. Supp. at 437–38.
191. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text.
192. Am. Bar Ass’n, 934 F. Supp., at 437–38; Wegner, supra note 89, at 444.
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It is not clear that the ABA’s full-time faculty requirement violated
the Sherman Act.193 Additionally, some of the consent decree’s
requirements were later criticized by accreditation experts as inconsistent
with best practices.194 Most significantly, the DOJ investigation and
consent decree must have influenced how the ABA later interpreted and
enforced its full-time faculty requirements. The consent decree’s
requirements led to the ABA’s relaxing, and ultimately eliminating, its
student-faculty ratio requirement.195 The decree also subjected the ABA
Council to years of federal oversight,196 which may have played a role in
2005, when the ABA revised Standard 402 to eliminate the requirement
that law schools employ at least six full-time faculty.197 The decree and
federal oversight also likely discouraged the ABA from enforcing its other
full-time faculty requirements.
In addition to the DOJ’s antitrust investigation and consent decree, for
years NACIQI198 has pressured the ABA to adopt an outcomes-focused
approach to accreditation. This pressure is evident in exchanges that
occurred between ABA representatives and NACIQI members at public

193. In their analysis of antitrust law as it applies to accreditation, Havighurst and Brody
predicted that “an antitrust agency or court would be hard-pressed to question the ABA’s
opinion concerning the maximum number of classroom hours that a law school may require
its professors to teach,” since such a standard is reasonably related to teaching quality.
Clark C. Havighurst & Peter M. Brody, Accrediting and the Sherman Act, 57 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 204 n.20 (1994). They observed it is “far from clear” that
accreditation alone affects competition and argued that private accreditor programs like the
ABA’s ordinarily should be subject to rational basis review. Id. at 218, 227. See also
Wegner, supra note 89, at 445 (questioning the rationale behind the DOJ’s challenge of the
ABA’s student-faculty ratio and teaching load standards).
Writing in 2001, Lao argued that the ABA Standards were anticompetitive and aimed
at promoting “an elite-style legal education;” she suggested the standards should be relaxed
to allow institutions to provide a more utilitarian, modest education at lower cost. Lao,
supra note 13, at 1086–91. But Lao acknowledged that an antitrust challenge might not be
successful, since courts “may be unwilling to review policy choices reflected in the
accrediting standards or to substitute their own opinions for those of the ABA” under a rule
of reason analysis. Lao, supra note 13, at 1096.
194. See Areen, supra note 82, at 1487–88. Areen characterized the consent decree’s
limiting of legal educators’ participation in the accreditation process as placing the ABA
“out of step with” other accrediting bodies, which rely heavily on peer evaluation. She
suggested the close involvement of legal educators serves to benefit, not undermine, the
goals of accreditation. Id. See also Eaton, supra note 87, at 4 (stating that higher education
accreditation is done “primarily” by faculty and administrators at peer institutions).
195. See supra notes 147–54 and accompanying text.
196. Wegner, supra note 89, at 446.
197. See supra note 129.
198. See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
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hearings held in 2006, 2011, and 2016 to consider whether to renew the
ABA’s recognition as an accrediting body.199
At its 2011 meeting, NACIQI ultimately voted to recommend
renewing the ABA’s recognition. But the committee interrogated the ABA
delegation at length about its accreditation practices, and three NACIQI
members voted against the recommendation.200 Areas of concern raised by
NACIQI members included student outcomes assessment, student bar
passage, publication of student job placement data and other consumer
information, student loan defaults, and standards (including full-time
faculty requirements) that were claimed to increase the cost of
education.201
An exchange between the ABA’s then-deputy consultant on legal
education (Dan Freeling) and a NACIQI member (Jamienne Studley)
during the 2011 meeting is revealing. The exchange addressed the ABA’s
faculty sufficiency requirements (Standards 402 and 403):
MS. STUDLEY: If a school is performing very well against the
outcome measures that you use . . . [a]re they freed up from the
input measures, or the formula in terms of, say balance of number
and type of faculty?
MR. FREELING: Our view is they are freed up. It is
extraordinarily rare, in fact I can’t remember in the past five years
. . . that we have cited schools for student/faculty ratio.202
Freeling also suggested that, if a school had a student-faculty ratio
exceeding the 30:1 threshold, it could then demonstrate success on student
199. Transcripts of meetings from the past ten years are available on the DOE website.
See
National
Advisory
Committee
on
Institutional
Quality
and
Integrity: Archive of Meetings, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://sites.ed.gov/naciqi/archiveof-meetings/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20210517231649/https://sites.ed.gov/naciqi/
archive-of-meetings/] (last visited Dec. 30, 2021). Although the transcript of NACIQI’s
2006 meeting with the ABA is not publicly available, NACIQI members pointedly
questioned the ABA representatives at that meeting as well. National Advisory Committee
on Institutional Quality and Integrity: Meeting, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., at 15–16, 60–61 (Jun.
9, 2011), https://sites.ed.gov/naciqi/files/naciqi-dir/2011-spring/6-9-11-naciqi-transcript.
pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20210517231934/https://sites.ed.gov/naciqi/files/naciqidir/2011-spring/6-9-11-naciqi-transcript.pdf] [hereinafter 2011 Transcript].
200. See Eric Kelderman, American Bar Association Takes Heat from Advisory Panel
on Accreditation, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 9, 2011), https://www.chronicle.com/artic
le/american-bar-association-takes-heat-from-advisory-panel-on-accreditation/ [https://
web.archive.org/web/20211004132652/https://www.chronicle.com/article/american-barassociation-takes-heat-from-advisory-panel-on-accreditation/].
201. 2011 Transcript, supra note 199, at 67–76, 128.
202. Id. at 92–93.
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outcome measures, such as academic attrition and bar passage rates.203
This exchange highlights both NACIQI’s negative view of an inputsfocused approach and the ABA’s response, emphasizing how it was not
enforcing the student-faculty ratio requirement.
At the 2016 meeting, NACIQI voted to recommend partially
suspending ABA recognition. Although the DOE did not follow
NACIQI’s recommendation, for several months the ABA’s status as a
DOE-recognized accreditor was uncertain.204 The political environment in
2016 was one of public frustration over the perceived failure of accreditors
to hold colleges and universities accountable for low student completion
rates, high student debt loads, and abuses in the for-profit sector.205 It was
also a time when the employment market for law graduates had not yet
recovered from the 2008 financial crisis and applications to law schools
had experienced years of decline. Undersecretary of Education Ted
Mitchell set the tone at the outset of the meeting, stating “[t]he only way”
to have an accreditation process that “allows the flexibility for innovation
and the rigor to hold institutions accountable” is to focus on student
outcomes.206
During the ABA’s presentation of its petition for recognition renewal,
NACIQI members grilled the ABA representatives on student debt, job
placement, and low bar passage rates, citing examples of schools that had
misled students regarding job placement or otherwise had poor student
outcomes.207 When asked whether the ABA put on probation, or withdrew
its approval from, any schools due to low bar passage rates, the ABA
representatives replied that it had not.208 The committee also pressed the
ABA on whether it was holding law schools accountable for poor graduate
job placement data, or for the effect job placement had on student debt
levels.209 A committee member asked about ABA standards, including
203. Id. at 94.
204. The NACIQI meeting was held on June 22 and the DOE’s letter to the ABA was
dated three months later—September 22, 2016. Stephanie Francis Ward, ABA Won’t Be
Suspended from Accrediting New Law Schools, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 23, 2016, 8:22
AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/aba_wont_be_suspended_from_accrediti
ng_new_law_schools [http://web.archive.org/web/20211004141901/https://www.abajour
nal.com/news/article/aba_wont_be_suspended_from_accrediting_new_law_schools].
205. See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text.
206. National Advisory Committee on Institutional Quality and Integrity (NACIQI), U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., at 5, (June 22, 2016), https://sites.ed.gov/naciqi/files/2016/08/naciqitranscripts-062216-508.pdf [http://web.archive.org/web/20211004142418/https://sites.
ed.gov/naciqi/files/2016/08/naciqi-transcripts-062216-508.pdf] [hereinafter 2016
Transcript].
207. Id. at 198, 207.
208. Id. at 182–83, 211.
209. Id. at 182–88.
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full-time faculty requirements, that “drive[] up the cost of a legal
education[.]”210 Another asked whether the ABA had data showing
whether these requirements were “absolutely critical to legal quality
education,” or instead reflected a “guild mentality.”211 One suggested the
ABA should allow a law school to operate with “nothing but adjuncts” if
doing so could dramatically reduce costs.212 The harsh questioning and
unsuccessful recommendation the ABA endured during the meeting likely
influenced the ABA Council when it proposed relaxing Standard 403(a)
the following year. The stated rationale for the Council’s proposal—
allowing schools more flexibility to innovate and characterizing the
counting of hours taught by full-time faculty as “more of an input
measure”213—reflects the influence of federal pressure.
Since the 2016 NACIQI meeting, the ABA has twice revoked its
approval of an accredited law school. It withdrew its approval of Thomas
Jefferson School of Law in 2019 and Arizona Summit Law School in
2018. It put Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School on probation in 2018.
The ABA also withdrew its approval of several additional schools that
ceased operations for financial reasons; the ABA had sanctioned some of
them before they closed. The Appendix lists instances since 2017 when
the ABA imposed sanctions on, or removed approval from, an institution.
In none of these instances did the ABA cite a school’s failure to comply
with its full-time faculty requirements.214 The standards the ABA has cited
as grounds for recent sanctions include Standards 501 (admissions
policies), 301 (rigorous academic program), 316 (bar passage), 309
(student support), and 202(a) and (d) (financial resources).215 In 2020, the
ABA issued a public notice, finding ten accredited law schools out of
compliance with its new, stricter bar-passage standard.216 Although the

210. Id. at 187.
211. Id. at 198–99.
212. Id. at 215–16.
213. See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
214. Similarly, review of the ABA’s public accreditation notices page does not show
any instances since 2016 where the ABA issued a public notice of noncompliance based
on a law school’s violation of Standard 402 or 403. See Sanctions, Remedial Action, and
Significant Noncompliance under Rule 11(a)(4), A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/gr
oups/legal_education/public-notice/sanctions-remedial-action-noncompliance/
[http://web.archive.org/web/20211004145158/https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal
_education/public-notice/sanctions-remedial-action-noncompliance/] (last vistied Dec. 30,
2021).
215. See id.
216. Stephanie Francis Ward, 10 Law Schools are out of Compliance with Bar Passage
Standard, ABA Legal Ed Section Says, A.B.A. J., (May 28, 2020, 12:30 PM) https://www
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ABA has recently stepped up its enforcement efforts, the stated grounds
for imposing sanctions (or giving public notice of a school’s
noncompliance with ABA standards) have not included full-time faculty
inadequacy.
During the same time period, many ABA-accredited schools relied
heavily on adjunct faculty. On average, schools employed 60% part-time
faculty during the 2018–19 academic year, and slightly less than 60%
during 2016–17 and 2017–18.217 Fifteen schools employed 75% or more
part-time faculty during 2018–19.218 The reported part-time faculty data
are somewhat misleading, since law schools tend to employ adjuncts to
teach a single course in a given semester or year. A more useful data point
would be the share of the curriculum taught by full-time faculty, but the
ABA does not currently require schools to make this information publicly
available.219
To a significant degree, reliance on adjunct faculty is appropriate to
legal education, a professional program whose purpose is to prepare
students for the practice of law. Most adjuncts who teach law are
experienced attorneys and judges and provide a valuable practical
perspective for law students. Recognizing the value of working
professionals as legal educators, the ABA Standards used to state that law
schools “should include” experienced practicing legal professionals, with
appropriate orientation and support, to enrich the educational program.220
At the same time, as the ABA Standards recognize, a JD curriculum taught
principally by adjuncts would be inadequate; a sound educational program
.abajournal.com/news/article/legal-ed-posts-public-notice-for-schools-out-of-compliancewith-bar-passage-standard [http://web.archive.org/web/20211004150720/https://www.
abajournal.com/news/article/legal-ed-posts-public-notice-for-schools-out-of-compliancewith-bar-passage-standard]. Standard 316, which requires at least 75% of a law school’s
graduates who sit for a bar exam to pass an exam within two years, was revised in 2019.
Id.
217. Percentages are calculated from data in ABA Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar, Standard 509 Required Disclosures: All Schools Data,
A.B.A., http://www.abarequireddisclosures.org/Disclosure509.aspx [https://web.archive.
org/web/20211106172830/https://www.abarequireddisclosures.org/Disclosure509.aspx]
(last visited Mar. 13, 2021) [hereinafter Standard 509 Database]. Law schools report
faculty data annually through the ABA Annual Questionnaire. According to the
questionnaire’s instructions, part-time (“non-full-time”) faculty include all instructors who
taught during the previous academic year, including the summer term. Full-time staff who
do not have faculty rank and teach a course are counted as part-time faculty. Annual
Questionnaire, infra note 302, at Part V, Question 2.
218. Id.
219. See infra Part V.B.1 (discussing why the ABA should make this information
publicly available).
220. ABA Standards [2013–14 version], supra note 118, Standard 403(c). The ABA
removed this language from Standard 403 when it was revised in 2014.
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in law must comprise a significant core of courses taught by full-time
faculty.221
To conclude, as the ABA’s history shows, the federal government,
most accrediting bodies, and other experts in higher education focus
almost exclusively on student outcomes when it comes to institutional
assessment. It is doubtful today that a college or university, even one
whose faculty is disproportionately made up of adjuncts, would be at risk
of losing its accreditation on the basis of faculty inadequacy, so long as
basic student outcomes measures (completion, debt default, employment,
and/or licensure rates) for that institution were acceptable.222 In this sense,
higher education accreditation not only has failed to protect against, but
has contributed to, the current state of the gig academy in the U.S.
However, it may be unrealistic to expect accrediting bodies, especially
regional accreditors that regulate a much broader range of institutions than
specialized accreditors do,223 to impose sanctions on institutions that fail
to adhere to full-time faculty minimums. Yet the extent of a college or
university’s reliance on adjunct faculty obviously matters to accrediting
bodies. Most accreditation standards still address faculty adequacy, as
discussed in the next section. As an alternative to strict enforcement,
requiring institutions to be more transparent about their investments in
full-time faculty would address public demands for accountability in
higher education and might also shape institutional behavior. The next
section explores how higher education accreditors might improve
transparency regarding compliance with their faculty adequacy
requirements.
V. RULES, STANDARDS, AND REGULATORY DISCLOSURE
This section contrasts the ABA’s full-time faculty requirements with
the more flexible, but vague, standards of other accrediting bodies. It
argues that clearer guidelines would put institutions on notice of expected
best practices and, in combination with mandatory reporting requirements,
facilitate the gathering and public reporting of full-time faculty data. The
section first contrasts the precision of ABA Standard 403(a) with
comparable regulations of other accrediting bodies, and then addresses
how regulatory disclosure might improve publicly available information
221. ABA Standards, supra note 118, Standard 403(a).
222. As a case in point, in 1999, the North Central Association, a regional accreditor
that has long taken an outcomes-focused approach to accreditation, accredited Jones
International University, an online institution with 96% adjunct faculty. Schmidt, supra
note 13. Jones International University ceased operations in 2015. See also Leatherman,
supra note 13 (describing several less extreme examples).
223. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
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about faculty resources and potentially influence college and university
behavior.
A. Rules versus Standards
Legal theorists have long debated the pros and cons of rules versus
standards. A rule determines up front the limits of permissible conduct,
whereas a standard leaves the determination of permissible conduct to the
adjudicator when applying the standard after the fact.224 For example, a
speed limit may be expressed either as a rule (a prohibition on driving over
55 miles per hour) or a standard (a prohibition on driving “at an excessive
speed”).225
From this standpoint, the ABA’s full-time faculty requirement looks
more like a rule than the regulations of other accrediting bodies. ABA
Standard 403(a),226 which requires full-time faculty to teach substantially
all first-year courses and more than half of all credits in the JD curriculum,
operates like a rule. In contrast, the Higher Learning Commission’s
Criterion 3.C.2, which requires “sufficient numbers and continuity of
faculty members to carry out both the classroom and non-classroom roles
of faculty,”227 exemplifies a standard. Table 1 contrasts ABA Standard
403(a) with the faculty adequacy regulations of five other major
accrediting bodies, including two regional accreditors and specialized
accreditors for engineering, business, and medicine.
Table 1: Accreditors’ Faculty Adequacy Regulations
Accreditor
HLC

Type of
accreditor
Regional:
Midwest

Faculty adequacy
regulation
Sufficient numbers and
continuity of faculty to
carry out classroom and
non-classroom faculty
roles.228

Rule or
standard?
Standard

224. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
559–60 (1992).
225. Id. at 560.
226. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
227. Criteria for Accreditation, HIGHER LEARNING COMM’N, Criterion 3.C.2 (2019)
[hereinafter HLC Criteria] https://download.hlcommission.org/policy/updates/AdoptedCr
iteriaRevision_2019_INF.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20210705192317/https://dow
nload.hlcommission.org/policy/updates/AdoptedCriteriaRevision_2019_INF.pdf].
228. Id.
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NECHE

Regional:
Northeast

AACSB

Specialized:
business

ABA

Specialized:
law

ABET

Specialized:
engineering

Adequate number of
faculty and academic staff
whose time commitment is
sufficient to assure
accomplishment of
essential classroom and
out-of-class
responsibilities.229
Normally, “participating
faculty members” will
deliver at least 75% of the
school’s teaching across
the unit and 60% of
teaching within each
discipline.230
Full-time faculty shall
teach substantially all of
the first year and more
than half of all credit hours
offered.231
Faculty are of
sufficient number to cover
all curricular areas and to
accommodate adequate
levels of faculty-student
interaction, advising,
service, professional
development, and
interaction with
practitioners and
employers.232
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Standard

Standard

Rule

Standard

229. NECHE Standards, supra note 88, Standard 6.2.
230. 2020 Guiding Principles and Standards for Business Accreditation, AACSB, Stan
dard 3.1 (2020) https://www.aacsb.edu/-/media/documents/accreditation/business/
standards-and-tables/2020-business-accreditation-standards.pdf?la=en&hash=E4B7D83
48A6860B3AA804567F02C68960281DA2 [https://web.archive.org/web/202112301955
43/https://www.aacsb.edu/-/media/documents/accreditation/business/standards-andtables/2020-business-accreditation-standards.pdf?la=en&hash=E4B7D8348A6860B3AA
9804567F02C68960281DA2] [hereinafter AACSB Standards]. The language in the table
is from the commentary to Standard 3.1.
231. ABA Standards, supra note 118, Standard 403(a). For the full text of Standard
403(a), see supra note 157 and accompanying text.
232. ABET Criteria, supra note 114, Criterion 6.
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Sufficient cohort of
faculty to deliver the
curriculum and meet other
institutional needs.233
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Standard

All but one of the faculty adequacy regulations summarized in Table
1 are written like standards. More significant than the generality of the
thresholds stated in all but the ABA regulation is the fact that only the ABA
regulation specifies that faculty must be employed on a full-time basis to
count for purposes of the regulation. The HLC, NECHE, ABET, and
LCME regulations do not set a required threshold of full-time faculty or
even require that faculty be employed full time, other than to state that
faculty must have sufficient “time” or “continuity” to address the
program’s needs. At first glance, AACSB Standard 3 looks like a rule. But
its requirement refers to “participating faculty members,” which is defined
like a standard, as someone who “actively and deeply engages in the
activities of the school in matters beyond teaching responsibilities.”234 In
contrast, the ABA Standards provide a precise definition of full-time
faculty235 and ABA Standard 403(a) specifies the portion of the curriculum
that must be taught by full-time faculty. Of the examples in Table 1, only
the ABA’s full-time faculty requirement is written like a rule.236
There are tradeoffs associated with using a standard versus a rule.
Although standards may be easier to create, they tend to be more difficult
to apply.237 The adjudicator (for example, a judge, or an accreditation site
visit team) must determine what the standard means each time a standard
is applied.238 A standard similarly presents challenges for the public, who
233. Functions and Structure of a Medical School: Standards for Accreditation of
Medical Education Programs Leading to the MD Degree, LIAISON COMM. ON MED. EDUC.,
Standard 4.1 (2020), https://medicine.vtc.vt.edu/content/dam/medicine_vtc_vt_edu/about/
accreditation/2018-19_Functions-and-Structure.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/
20211230200755/https://medicine.vtc.vt.edu/content/dam/medicine_vtc_vt_edu/about/ac
creditation/2018-19_Functions-and-Structure.pdf] [hereinafter LCME Standards].
234. AACSB Standards, supra note 230, Standard 3 Definitions. The definition goes on
to state that participating faculty members normally are considered “ongoing” members of
the faculty, regardless of whether appointments are on a part- or full-time basis. Id.
235. See supra note 131 for the ABA Standards’ definition of full-time faculty member.
236. The HLC Criteria and NECHE Standards are not unique in their generality; the
faculty sufficiency requirements in other regional accreditation standards are similarly
vaguely written. See Leatherman, supra note 13 (“no accreditor stipulates a formula for
achieving the right balance” between full- and part-time faculty); Henry, supra note 13
(stating that accreditation standards tend to be written “in such general terms that, given an
effective spin, virtually any topic or issue could be said to have been addressed”).
237. Kaplow, supra note 224, at 562–63.
238. Id.
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must figure out its meaning in order to comply with it.239 For this reason,
rules tend to better promote compliance.240 Additionally, since they tend
to be more transparent, rules are more likely to lead to the development of
community norms, providing the public an added incentive to comply with
them.241 Finally, rules limit the discretion of the adjudicator, allowing less
leeway for the adjudicator to make bad or corrupt decisions when applying
the regulation to concrete cases.242
Diver identifies three goals to be balanced when determining how
precise a regulation should be: transparency, accessibility (the regulation
is easily applicable to concrete situations), and congruence (the content of
the regulation aligns with the intended behavior).243 Determining the
precision of a regulation may involve tradeoffs among these goals.244
Diver uses the example of the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA)
mandatory retirement rule (prohibiting pilots from flying commercial
airplanes after their sixtieth birthday) to illustrate these tradeoffs. The
bright-line, precise rule is both transparent and accessible, but at the cost
of congruence, “depriv[ing] society of the services of safe, experienced
sexagenarians.”245 More precise rules promote compliance and minimize
disputes over application at the cost of being over- or under-inclusive.246
Ultimately, the benefits of transparency and applicability (as well as erring
on the side of public safety) won out over concerns that the FAA rule was
too strict or imposed costs on older pilots.247
Applying this analysis to accreditors’ faculty adequacy requirements,
the ABA’s relatively precise rule enhances transparency and promotes
compliance. But it does so by potentially erring on the side of ensuring a
quality educational experience,248 which limits the flexibility for law
schools to reduce costs by hiring more adjunct faculty. On the other hand,
the other faculty adequacy regulations listed in Table 1 provide flexibility
for colleges and universities to allocate faculty resources as they see fit.
239. Id. at 564.
240. Id.
241. Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards
Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 54–55 (2000).
242. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 44–45 (1990).
243. Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65,
67 (1983).
244. Id. at 71.
245. Id. at 72–73.
246. Id. at 73–74.
247. Id. at 80–83.
248. It is also possible the ABA’s precise rule might err on the side of being too lenient.
But in the past, the ABA has experienced pressure from the government for being overly
strict with its full-time faculty requirements, not for being overly lenient. See supra Part
IV.B.
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But these standards do so by promulgating vague regulations that allow
for significant discretion in their enforcement. Because the standards
disincentivize compliance, they have failed to constrain colleges and
universities from relying on vast numbers of adjunct faculty.
As discussed in Part III, when evaluating institutional quality, the
government as well as accreditors tend to look to student outcomes. At a
basic level, student outcomes assessment involves determining whether
students in a program graduate, obtain a license to practice, get a job, or
repay their loans.249 Other student learning outcomes—such as
demonstrating the ability to communicate effectively, conduct research,
identify and navigate ethical challenges, or engage in critical thinking—
are more nuanced.250 Relying on student attainment of these more
subjective standards as a measure of a program’s quality involves
significant discretion. Using more nuanced outcomes as a basis for making
accreditation decisions requires much greater effort, expertise, and sound
judgment on the part of accreditors than a quantitative rule would require.
At the same time, measuring minimum educational quality solely by
reference to outcomes like graduation or student loan repayment rates
arguably sets too low a bar for institutions to meet. The advantage of
establishing a precise full-time faculty sufficiency threshold is that it
operates to put accreditors (and the public) on notice that an institution is
at risk of not carrying out its program of study effectively and in
compliance with applicable accreditation standards.
B. Regulatory Disclosure
If it is unrealistic to expect all accrediting bodies to hold institutions
to strict full-time faculty requirements, an alternative is to require colleges
and universities to publicly disclose full-time faculty data. Regulatory
disclosure relies on markets and public opinion251 to promote regulatory
objectives, like protecting the environment or preventing fraud in
securities markets. If designed well, disclosure schemes not only improve
249. The accreditation standards of NECHE require institutions to measure student
success in achieving the following outcomes: rates of progression; retention, transfer, and
graduation; default and loan repayment rates; licensure passage rates; and employment.
NECHE Standards, supra note 88, Standard 8.6.
250. ABET’s accreditation standards for engineering programs requires programs to
document student attainment of specific outcomes, including but not limited to: the ability
to identify, formulate, and solve complex engineering problems; to communicate
effectively; to function effectively on a team; and to conduct experimentation, analyze data,
and use engineering judgment to draw conclusions. ABET Standards, supra note 114,
Criterion 3.
251. Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of Environmental
Risks, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 155, 163 (1998).
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publicly available information but also promote compliance by the entity
disclosing the relevant information.252 This section first addresses
scholarship on disclosure-based regulation. It then describes two higher
education mandatory disclosure regimes: the ABA’s Standard 509 and the
DOE’s College Navigator. The section also considers how required
disclosure of faculty resources data by colleges and universities might be
improved, applying literature on disclosure-based regulation to the higher
education context.
Scholars have addressed how cognitive biases limit the potential
effectiveness of disclosure-based regulation.253 Disclosures that are not
standardized or designed to facilitate comparisons are less likely to be
useful to consumers.254 To induce changes in consumer behavior, the
disclosed information should be “concrete” and “emotionally interesting,”
since this kind of information is more likely to bring up personally relevant
associations in the reader.255 For mandated disclosure to be effective,
therefore, the disclosed information must be useful to the intended
audience.256 As Sunstein observes, “[w]ith respect to information, less may
be more. If information is not provided in a clear and usable form, it may
actually make people less knowledgeable than they were before . . . .
People also face a pervasive risk of ‘information overload[.]’”257 Dalley
identifies several conditions that must be present for regulatory disclosure
to operate in markets to influence institutional behavior: consumers must
sufficiently care about the information to change their behavior in
response to it, the decision must be within the consumers’ control, and the
entity making the disclosures must be in a position to change its behavior
in response to changes in consumer behavior.258
A well-known study of restaurant hygiene card requirements259
illustrates how regulatory disclosure can affect behavior. The study found
that adoption of a county ordinance requiring Los Angeles restaurants to
252. Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1108 (2007).
253. Id. at 1113–17; Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational
Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 626–29 (1999); Margaret Kwoka &
Bridget DuPey, Targeted Transparency as Regulation, 48 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 389, 437–
39.
254. Dalley, supra note 252, at 1116.
255. Id. at 1117 (referring to the availability bias in behavioral economics literature).
256. Id. at 1120.
257. Sunstein, supra note 253, at 627. Additionally, mandated disclosure may have
“disproportionately little effect” on low-income, elderly, and uneducated individuals. Id.
at 628.
258. Dalley, supra note 252, at 1120–21.
259. Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, The Effect of Information on Product Quality:
Evidence from Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards, 118 Q. J. ECON. 409 (2003).
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prominently display hygiene grade cards in their windows induced the
restaurants to improve their hygiene quality. Before the grade cards were
introduced, restaurant revenue was not sensitive to hygiene scores. But
afterwards, obtaining an A grade caused restaurant revenue to be 5%
higher than obtaining a B grade.260 The grade cards also caused local
hospitalizations related to foodborne illnesses to decrease by 20%.261 The
restaurant hygiene grading card example illustrates how disclosure
requirements can induce the disclosing party to change its behavior in
response to market pressure. The example also highlights the importance
of well-designed regulatory disclosure.262 To be effective, regulations
should mandate that the relevant information be presented in a compelling
and useful way and in a manner that facilitates comparisons among
disclosers.
There is reason for skepticism that prospective students, particularly
low-income and first-generation students, would make college choices in
response to publicly available full-time faculty data. Many prospective
students and their families are overwhelmed by the college information
available to them; one financial aid administrator characterized the
information overload as “a blizzard of white noise.”263 A study of Chicago
Public School students found that half of the students who aspired to attend
a four-year college ended up attending community college or not attending
college at all.264 Many students enrolled in colleges with lower selectivity
levels than what matched their qualifications.265 Information overload and
a lack of guidance for prospective students, therefore, potentially limit the
effectiveness of regulatory disclosure.
On the other hand, regulatory disclosure may prompt a political
response from the discloser, even if there is little or no consumer
response.266 Public opinion, both in a broad sense and operating in
260. Id. at 410.
261. Id. The reduction in foodborne illnesses was not only explained by customers
changing their restaurant choices, but also by improvements in hygiene quality. Id. at 410–
11.
262. See Id. at 432 (discussing how hygiene grade cards provide a useful signal that
assists consumers in sorting high-quality from low-quality establishments).
263. PIRS hearing, supra note 116, at 59 (testimony of Jesse O’Connell).
264. MELISSA RODERICK ET AL., FROM HIGH SCHOOL TO THE FUTURE: POTHOLES ON THE
ROAD TO COLLEGE 3 (2008), https://consortium.uchicago.edu/publications/high-schoolfuture-potholes-road-college [http://web.archive.org/web/20211004181423/https://
consortium.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/2018-10/CCSR_Potholes_Report.pdf].
265. Id. at 85. The mismatch between qualifications and college choice was attributed
to multiple factors, including a lack of guidance as to what was available and the fact that
students did not understand the financial aid process or apply in time to receive an aid
award. Id. at 85–86.
266. Sunstein, supra note 253, at 619.
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“smaller communities related directly to” the disclosing entity, can play a
role in enforcing norms.267 Sunstein gives the example of a statute
requiring companies to place an eco-label on their products; regardless of
the consumer response to the product labels, the companies may be
incentivized to become more environmentally conscious from the risk of
a negative reaction from stakeholders such as shareholders or local
legislators.268 In another example, activist shareholders and nongovernmental organizations exert leverage over multinational
corporations by publicizing the sweatshop conditions under which their
products are made.269 Like multinational corporations, colleges and
universities are sensitive to public opinion, and have a diverse range of
stakeholders who exert influence over them, including faculty, staff,
students, trustees, donors, alumni, and the local community. Baker et al.
found that Canadian universities responded to public sector salary
disclosure laws by raising the salaries of their female faculty.270 The
introduction of pay transparency laws reduced the gender pay gap in
Canadian public universities by 30%, attributable mainly to increases in
female salaries.271 These effects were seen primarily in universities with
unionized faculty, suggesting that faculty unions are an influential
stakeholder group.272
Additionally, information intermediaries—experts who make
complex information accessible to the public—may cut through
information overload and enhance the effectiveness of publicly-disclosed
information.273 Examples of intermediaries in the securities market include
portfolio managers, rating agencies, and the financial press, who sift
through, analyze, and present disclosed information.274 Nongovernmental
organizations operate as information intermediaries in the context of
environmental regulation.275 In the higher education context,
intermediaries that gather, analyze, and standardize information disclosed

267. Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 251, at 159.
268. Sunstein, supra note 253, at 619.
269. David J. Doorey, Who Made That?: Influencing Foreign Labor Practices through
Reflexive Domestic Disclosure Regulation, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353, 355–56 (2005).
270. See Michael Baker, et al., Pay Transparency and the Gender Gap, (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25834, 2019), https://www.nber.org/system/files/wor
king_papers/w25834/w25834.pdf [http://web.archive.org/web/20210903214137/https://
www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w25834/w25834.pdf].
271. Id. at 4.
272. Id. at 20.
273. Dalley, supra note 252, at 1101; Kwoka & DuPey, supra note 253, at 438.
274. Dalley, supra note 252, at 1102.
275. Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 251, at 161 (referring to nongovernmental
organizations as “public surrogates”).
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by colleges and universities for public consumption include ranking
bodies such as U.S. News & World Report (U.S. News).
In spite of the often-negative attention U.S. News attracts,276 the
impact of the U.S. News rankings on the reputation of colleges,
universities, and law schools is undeniable. The U.S. News rankings
strongly influence the choices prospective students and their families
make, whether at the undergraduate or graduate level.277 A rise or fall in
an institution’s rankings affects the number of applications it receives, its
selectivity rate, the average credentials of its entering class, and the
amount of merit aid it must spend to attract a strong entering class.278 As
Bastedo and Bowman observed, “[w]hen prestige is academic currency,
the result is a ‘positional arms race’” to attract the best students.279 The
rankings have significantly affected how elite colleges and universities are
rated by peer institutions in subsequent years, independent of other
measures of institutional quality and performance.280 The fact that
institutions try to “game the system” is further evidence of the influence
the U.S. News ratings exert over higher education institutions.281
U.S. News divides colleges and universities into different groups
(national universities, national liberal arts colleges, regional universities,

276. Seto cites dozens of law review articles dedicated to the law school rankings alone.
Theodore P. Seto, Understanding the U.S. News Law School Rankings, 60 SMU. L. REV.
493, 493 n.1 (2007). In 1997, 150 law school deans signed a letter of protest against the
rankings. Id. at 493–94.
277. Michael N. Bastedo & Nicholas A. Bowman, U.S. News & World Report College
Rankings: Modeling Institutional Effects on Organizational Reputation, 116 AM. J. EDUC.
163, 179 (2010) (citing multiple studies).
278. RONALD G. EHRENBERG, REACHING FOR THE BRASS RING: HOW THE U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT RANKINGS SHAPE THE COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT IN U.S. HIGHER
EDUCATION 4 (2001), https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED470061.pdf [http://web.archive.o
rg/web/20211004191446/https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED470061.pdf].
279. Bastedo & Bowman, supra note 277, at 180.
280. Id. at 165.
281. See, e.g., Stephanie C. Emens, The Methodology & Manipulation of the U.S. News
Law School Rankings, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 197 (2009) (discussing the strategies law schools
utilize to move up in the rankings); Bastedo & Bowman, supra note 277, at 179 (referring
to the numerous ways colleges and universities try to manipulate reported data);
EHRENBERG, supra note 278, at 9–18 (citing examples of the same). A former business
school dean at Temple University was indicted on wire fraud charges for submitting false
data to U.S. News. Scott Jaschik, Ex-dean at Temple Indicted on Charges of Manipulating
Rankings, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.insidehighered.com/admission
s/article/2021/04/19/ex-dean-temple-indicted-charges-manipulating-rankings [http://web.
archive.org/web/20211004192303/https://www.insidehighered.com/admissions/article/20
21/04/19/ex-dean-temple-indicted-charges-manipulating-rankings].
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and regional colleges), and ranks each group separately.282 Its
methodology283 involves weighing seventeen factors, metrics of
institutional quality, organized into eight categories.284 Faculty resources
is given a weight of 20%; the factors included in this category comprise
class size, faculty compensation, percent faculty with a terminal degree in
their field, percent full-time faculty, and student-faculty ratio.285 Notably,
U.S. News relies principally on the survey data it collects from colleges
and universities; it only relies on IPEDS data when a college or university
fails to respond to the survey.286 U.S. News and collaborators developed
the survey tool, the Common Data Set, to gather more standardized data
from colleges and universities.287 The survey uses a uniform definition of
282. Robert Morse & Eric Brooks, A More Detailed Look at the Ranking Factors, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 13, 2020, 9:00 PM), https://www.usnews.com/education/bestcolleges/articles/ranking-criteria-and-weights [http://web.archive.org/web/
20211004192420/https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/articles/rankingcriteria-and-weights]; see also EHRENBERG, supra note 278, at 7–8 (describing U.S. News
methodology as of 2000).
283. The law school rankings are handled differently. Although both the Best Colleges
and law school rankings include student-faculty ratio as a factor within the faculty
resources category, the list of factors used and the weights given to them are different.
Compare Morse & Brooks, supra note 282, with Robert Morse, Ari Castonguay, & Juan
Vega-Rodriguez, Methodology: 2021 Best Law Schools Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP. (Mar. 16, 2020, 9:00 PM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduateschools/articles/law-schools-methodology [http://web.archive.org/web/20211004192706/
https://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/articles/law-schoolsmethodology]. The data sources differ as well. For the Best Colleges rankings, U.S. News
uses the student-faculty ratio from the Common Data Set, see infra note 285, whereas for
the law school rankings, schools self-report the student-faculty ratio using the full-time
faculty definition and faculty counts from the ABA Annual Questionnaire. E-mail from
Robert J. Morse, Chief Data Strategist, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., to author (Mar. 22,
2021, 8:45 CST) (on file with author).
284. The categories are graduation and retention rates, social mobility (graduation rate
of Pell Grant recipients), graduation rate performance (comparing predicted with actual
graduation rates), academic reputation, faculty resources, student selectivity, financial
resources per student, and average alumni giving rate. Morse & Brooks, supra note 282.
285. Id. Similar to the IPEDS survey, infra note 318 and accompanying text, the
Common Data Set counts a part-time faculty member as one-third of a full-time faculty
member for purposes of calculating the student-faculty ratio. See Common Data Set 2020–
2021, COMMON DATA SET, Part I-2, https://commondataset.org/ [http://web.archive.org/
web/20211004211759/https://commondataset.org/] (last visited Dec. 30, 2021).
286. E-mail from Robert J. Morse, Chief Data Strategist, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
to author (Mar. 22, 2021, 8:34 CST) (on file with author). Fewer than 10% of the colleges
and universities surveyed fail to respond. Id.
287. U.S. News collaborated with The College Board and Peterson’s, an educational
services company, to develop the Common Data Set, with the stated objective of improving
the quality and accuracy of reported information from higher education institutions.
Common Data Set Initiative, COMMON DATA SET, https://commondataset.org/ [http://
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full-time faculty.288 The IPEDS survey, in contrast, leaves the definition
of full-time faculty to the reporting institution.289
To summarize, it is doubtful that mandated public disclosure of fulltime faculty data would significantly affect the higher education market
by changing enrollment decisions of prospective students and their
families. But faculty data are more likely to be influential if presented in a
compelling way that facilitates comparisons among institutions, as
discussed below. Additionally, mandated disclosure of full-time faculty
data may influence public opinion of higher education institutions through
the targeted pressure of stakeholder groups and the work of information
intermediaries like U.S. News. Colleges and universities are quite sensitive
to public opinion, whether on a national or local level. Although most of
the faculty resources data U.S. News uses to calculate its college ratings
are reported directly to it, improving the transparency of IPEDS faculty
resource data would be useful to public consumers while promoting
competition among college and university ranking bodies.
1. ABA Standard 509
Responding to a DOE requirement, the ABA adopted Standard 509 in
1996.290 In its original form, the standard was relatively general, simply
requiring law schools to “publish basic consumer information” in a “fair
and accurate manner.”291 In 2012, after the reporting violations described
below, the ABA strengthened Standard 509, moving details from
Interpretation 509-1 into the text and adding to the list of required
disclosures. Language also was added to Standard 509 to clarify that its
violation could result in the imposition of sanctions.292 In 2013, the ABA
revised Standard 509 again to standardize the format in which some of the

web.archive.org/web/20211004211759/https://commondataset.org/] (last visited Dec. 30,
2021).
288. Common Data Set 2020–2021, supra note 285, at Part I-1. The Common Data Set
uses the same definition of “full-time instructional faculty” that the AAUP uses for its
annual Faculty Compensation Survey. Id. The definition includes faculty who are
employed on a full-time basis with contracts for the full academic year and excludes
administrators who teach part time. Id.
289. See supra note 1.
290. Wegner, supra note 89, at 448.
291. ABA Standards [1996 version], supra note 118, Standard 509. Interpretation 5091 specified what counted as basic consumer information, a list that included “composition
and number of faculty and administrators.” Id.
292. ABA Standards [2012–13 version], supra note 118, Standard 509.
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consumer information was to be published.293 Standard 509 consumer data
are published on schools’ websites and are also publicly available through
the ABA.294 The adjunct faculty data referenced above295 were collected
from the ABA’s Standard 509 database. The ABA has made significant
strides in its gathering and publishing of law school consumer information.
The data law schools must report and make available on their websites in
a standardized format include student outcomes data (bar passage,
attrition, and post-graduation employment data) as well as class size and
full- and part-time faculty data.296 Regulatory disclosure has become a
significant part of the ABA’s accreditation work.
Law schools that have violated Standard 509 have faced severe
consequences. In 2011, the ABA publicly censured Villanova for
reporting inaccurate admissions data, requiring it to undergo a compliance
audit for two years.297 In 2012, the ABA sanctioned the University of
Illinois for reporting inaccurate admissions data, imposing a $250,000 fine
and two years of compliance monitoring.298 The ABA utilized the fines
collected to conduct targeted auditing of schools’ disclosures.299 When the
job market for law graduates collapsed after the 2008 financial crisis,
293. See Memorandum from Barry A. Currier, Managing Director, to the American Bar
Association, Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Office of the
Consultant on Legal Education, (August 2013) https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam
/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/governancedocuments/2
013_standard_509_memo.pdf [http://web.archive.org/web/20211004213147/https://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_th
e_bar/governancedocuments/2013_standard_509_memo.pdf ] (describing the information
for which the ABA Council “prescribes a particular form, manner and time frame of
publication” and discussing the reporting and publication requirements).
294. Standard 509 Database, supra note 217.
295. See supra notes 217–18 and accompanying text.
296. For example, UIC Law’s current Standard 509 Information Report, available at
https://uofi.app.box.com/s/mf934d0lcaph5gbbnsdzcgjo1y6m12a4
[https://web.archive.org/web/20220105171335/https://uofi.app.box.com/s/mf934d0lcaph
5gbbnsdzcgjo1y6m12a4] (last visited Jan. 5, 2022).
297. Martha Neil, ABA Raps Villanova re Inaccurate Admission Data, Says Law School
Must Post Censure Online, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 15, 2011, 8:23 PM), https://www.abajournal.
com/news/article/abas_legal_ed_section_sanctions_villanova [http://web.archive.org/web
/20211004214009/https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/abas_legal_ed_section_sanct
ions_villanova]. The sanctions were not more severe since Villanova reported the violation
and promptly addressed it once it came to light. Id.
298. Mark Hansen, U of Illinois Law School is Publicly Censured by the ABA, Fined for
Misreporting Admissions Data, A.B.A. J. (July 24, 2012, 8:20 PM), https://www.abajour
nal.com/news/article/u_of_illinois_law_school_is_publicly_censured_for_misreporting_a
dmissions_d [http://web.archive.org/web/20211004214543/https://www.abajournal.com/
news/article/u_of_illinois_law_school_is_publicly_censured_for_misreporting_admissio
ns_d].
299. 2016 Transcript, supra note 206, at 193–94 (testimony of Barry Currier).
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students sued numerous law schools, alleging false or misleading reporting
of graduate employment data.300 In adjudicating these claims, an
institution’s compliance with Standard 509 was an important factor.301 The
prospect of enforcement, whether by the ABA or through stakeholder
litigation, creates strong incentives for law schools to provide accurate
information.
However, there is an important omission from the ABA’s public
disclosure requirements: they do not mandate disclosure of law schools’
compliance with ABA Standard 403(a). The Standard 509 disclosures
should include data on the number and percentage of courses taught by
full-time faculty, both for first-year courses and for all courses taught
during the reporting year. Requiring institutions to report publicly on their
adherence to Standard 403(a) would promote compliance and provide the
public with concrete and useful data on law school faculty resources. The
share of a student’s classes taught by full-time faculty is a concrete
indicator of the student experience. Law schools are already required to
report course-level information to the ABA in their annual questionnaires,
including the names of the faculty teaching each course,302 so including
data on Standard 403(a) compliance should not overburden schools.303
2. College Navigator
College Navigator and College Scorecard are government-developed
tools for researching and comparing college and university data. The data
that appear in these tools are reported to the federal government, mainly
to the DOE’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). NCES
300. Christopher Polchin, Raising the Bar on Law School Data Reporting: Solutions to
the Transparency Problem, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 201, 207–08 (2012).
301. See, e.g., Phillips v. DePaul Univ., No. 12-CH-3523, 2012 Ill. Cir. LEXIS 3299, at
*22–23 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 11, 2012) (“compliance with ABA Standard 509 precludes any
claim for consumer fraud based on the provision of employment information to prospective
and enrolled students”); cf. Gomez-Jimenez v. N.Y. L. Sch., 956 N.Y.S.2d 54, 58–59 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2012) (finding the law school’s disclosures to be “statistical gamesmanship” that
the ABA criticized in revised guidelines, but not materially misleading).
302. See Questionnaires & Applications: Annual Questionnaire, A.B.A., Part V,
Question 3 [hereinafter Annual Questionnaire], https://www.americanbar.org/groups/lega
l_education/resources/questionnaire/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20211004220627/https:
//www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions
_to_the_bar/Questionnaires/2021/2021-22-aq-instructions-complete.pdf] (last visited Dec.
30, 2021).
303. Standard 403(a) allows schools to meet the standard either by showing that (i) more
than half of all credit hours offered or (ii) two-thirds of student contact hours are taught by
full-time faculty. ABA Standards, supra note 118, Standard 403(a). To facilitate
comparisons among institutions, schools should be required to report on the same metric,
which likely would be credit hours offered.
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began surveying colleges and universities on a voluntary basis during the
1960s; it developed the IPEDS survey during the 1980s.304 In 1991,
Congress made IPEDS reporting mandatory as a condition to eligibility
for federal student financial aid.305 IPEDS’ role has evolved from a
compliance reporting tool to a repository of data for higher education
institutions and the public.306 College Navigator was a product of the 2008
amendments to the Higher Education Act; the Obama Administration
launched College Scorecard in 2015.307 College Scorecard facilitates
comparisons of data across institutions on factors like student diversity,
average annual cost, graduation rate, and post-graduation earnings.308 In
2016, Google announced it was collaborating with College Scorecard to
make Scorecard data appear in Google searches of a particular
institution.309 Although faculty resources data are not retrievable for
comparison through College Scorecard, they are accessible in College
Navigator, which allows a deeper dive into more granular college data.
College Navigator allows students to research the wealth of
information that colleges and universities report to the government
through the IPEDS survey—from admissions and student enrollment data
to net price (cost minus financial aid), student debt default rates, and
campus crime data.310 The faculty resources data on College Navigator
include numbers of full- and part-time faculty and student-faculty ratio.
Table 2 displays faculty resources data recently retrieved from the College
Navigator page for the University of Wisconsin-Madison, my
undergraduate alma mater.

304. Elise S. Miller & Jessica M. Shedd, The History and Evolution of IPEDS, 181 NEW
DIRECTIONS INST. RES. 47, 48 (2019).
305. Id. at 49. The DOE also imposes substantial fines for noncompliance with IPEDS
reporting obligations, which has improved response rates significantly. Id.
306. Id. at 52.
307. Id. at 50.
308. See College Scorecard, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/sear
ch/[http://web.archive.org/web/20211004215720/https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/search/?
page=0&sort=completion_rate:desc&toggle=institutions] (last visited Jan. 5, 2022).
309. Eaton, supra note 105.
310. See, e.g., College Navigator: University of Wisconsin-Madison General
Information, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/collegenavigator/?q=univ
ersity+of+wisconsin+madison&s=all&id=240444#general [http://web.archive.org/web/2
0211004215911/https://nces.ed.gov/collegenavigator/?q=university+of+wisconsin+madis
on&s=all&id=240444#expenses] (last visited Dec. 30, 2021).
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Table 2: University of Wisconsin-Madison Faculty Data311
Faculty by Primary Function, Fall 2019
Total faculty
Instructional
Research and public service

Full-time
4,839
3,588
1,251

Part-time
1,357
1,138
219

Student-faculty ratio – 17:1
Although the amount of institutional data available to prospective
students and their families through these tools is extensive, the data can
and should be improved.
Most significantly, the full-time faculty information reported to
IPEDS is unreliable for comparison purposes, because definitions of “fulltime” and “part-time” faculty are left to the reporting institutions. Since
definitional approaches vary significantly across institutions, the faculty
counts reported in IPEDS are not reliable.312 In contrast, the survey
instrument developed and used by U.S. News adopts a uniform definition
of full-time faculty, addressing a limitation of the IPEDS survey.313
However, U.S. News controls the data it collects, and since the U.S. News
survey is not mandatory, the response rate, although high, cannot achieve
the level of IPEDS. Participation in the IPEDS survey is mandatory for
any institution that is eligible for federal financial aid, ensuring a typical
response rate of about 100%.314 Incorporating the Common Data Set
311. Id.
312. DENISE S. GATER & JOHN V. LOMBARDI, THE USE OF IPEDS/AAUP FACULTY DATA
IN INSTITUTIONAL PEER COMPARISONS 2–3, 6 (2001), https://mup.umass.edu/sites/default/
files/mup-pdf/MUP-Publication-2001-The-Use-of-IPEDS-AAUP-Faculty-Data-inInstitutional-Peer-Comparisons.pdf [http://web.archive.org/web/20211004220104/https://
mup.umass.edu/sites/default/files/mup-pdf/MUP-Publication-2001-The-Use-of-IPEDSAAUP-Faculty-Data-in-Institutional-Peer-Comparisons.pdf]. Although NCES has since
improved consistency by combining the faculty salary and staff surveys, the lack of a
consistent definition of “full-time faculty” in the IPEDS survey remains a concern. E-mail
from Bill Hayward, Associate Vice Provost and Director, Office of Institutional Research,
University of Illinois at Chicago, to author (Mar. 23, 2021, 17:08 CST) (on file with
author).
313. See supra note 287–88 and accompanying text. Many universities make their
responses to the survey public (the Common Data Set). See, e.g., Stanford University
Communications, Stanford Common Data Set, https://ucomm.stanford.edu/cds/[http://we
b.archive.org/web/20211004220200/https://ucomm.stanford.edu/cds/] (last visited Dec.
30, 2021).
314. IPEDS Survey Methodology: Web Content: Introduction, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/ReportYourData/IpedsSurveyMethodologyPrint?section
=1 [http://web.archive.org/web/20211004220329/https://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/ReportYourD
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definition of full-time faculty into the IPEDS survey would improve
IPEDS faculty data while also harmonizing the full-time faculty definition
with one colleges and universities are already using. Improving publicly
available IPEDS data would also support the work of other higher
education ranking bodies, lowering barriers on entry to, and promoting
competition within, the rankings market.315 For example, Washington
Monthly is a college rankings body that describes itself as the public
interest “answer to U.S. News.” Washington Monthly ranks four-year
colleges “based on what they do for the country.”316 It utilizes IPEDS data
to calculate its rankings.317
Another limitation of the faculty resources data presented in College
Navigator is that they are unlikely to be meaningful to the public. Since
the faculty data are presented at the university level, they are abstract and
not indicative of what a student might expect in terms of program faculty.
Nor do the data provide a sense of what the first-year classroom experience
will be like. Although student-faculty ratio is a metric that facilitates
comparisons among institutions, it does not give a clear picture of a college
or university’s reliance on adjunct faculty. The ratio is calculated by

ata/IpedsSurveyMethodologyPrint?section=1] (last visited Dec. 30, 2021); Miller &
Shedd, supra note 304, at 49.
315. In her analysis of bond rating agency regulation, Hill discusses the natural barriers
on entry to the rating agency market, particularly the need for substantial resources and “an
established reputation” to make reliable comparisons among large numbers of bond issues.
Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 43, 62–63 (2004).
Therefore, the main regulatory goal should be “to neutralize” barriers on entry to the rating
agency business. Id. at 84. See also Seto, supra note 276, at 561 (suggesting that the secrecy
of reported information “raises significant barriers to entry for possible U.S. News
competitors”).
316. 2019 College Rankings, WASH. MONTHLY, https://washingtonmonthly.com/2019c
ollege-guide [http://web.archive.org/web/20211004220542/https://washingtonmonthly.
com/2019college-guide] (last visited Dec. 30, 2021).
317. A Note on Methodology: 4-Year Colleges and Universities, WASH. MONTHLY,
(Sept.–Oct. 2019), https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/september-october-2019/anote-on-methodology-4-year-colleges-and-universities-10/ [http://web.archive.org/web/
20211004220732/https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/september-october-2019/anote-on-methodology-4-year-colleges-and-universities-10/]. The Wall Street
Journal/Times Higher Education College Rankings similarly uses IPEDs data on studentfaculty ratios at institutions. Wall Street Journal/Times Higher Education College
Rankings 2022 Methodology, THE WORLD UNIV. RANKINGS (Sept. 14, 2021), https://ww
w.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/wall-street-journal-times-highereducation-college-rankings-2022 [https://web.archive.org/web/20211230225540/https://
www.timeshighereducation.com/world-university-rankings/wall-street-journal-timeshigher-education-college-rankings-2022].
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including both full- and part-time faculty, with each part-time faculty
member counting as one-third of a full-time faculty member.318
The IPEDS survey should be revised to gather more concrete
information on full-time faculty staffing of undergraduate courses,
especially introductory courses because of their demonstrated impact on
the college experience and student success.319 Although the Common Data
Set does not include this information either, it does include data on the
numbers of varying sizes of undergraduate “class sections” offered at
institutions (in increments ranging from fewer than ten to 100 or more
students).320 The Common Data Set already utilizes a uniform definition
of “full-time faculty,” so harmonizing IPEDS definitions and questions
with those in the Common Data Set would improve data while minimizing
reporting burdens on institutions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Colleges and universities responded to the financial strain brought on
by the coronavirus pandemic by laying off a tenth of their faculty and staff.
Over 570,000 higher education employees—disproportionately lowincome and non-white—left the work force between March 2020 and
April 2021.321 A few institutions used the COVID–19 pandemic as cover
to abrogate tenure. The University of Akron invoked force majeure under
its collective bargaining agreement with the faculty union, laying off
ninety-seven tenured and non-tenured full-time faculty.322 The Kansas
Board of Regents voted to significantly weaken tenure at public

318. IPEDS 2019–2020 Survey Materials: Instructions, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.,
Part F, Line F16, https://surveys.nces.ed.gov/IPEDS_PY/VisInstructions.aspx?survey=6
&id=30074&show=all [https://web.archive.org/web/20211106180636/https://surveys.nce
s.ed.gov/IPEDS_PY/VisInstructions.aspx?survey=6&id=30074&show=all].
319. See supra notes 63–68 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of
faculty-student relationships during the first year of college).
320. Common Data Set 2020–2021, supra note 285, at I-3.
321. Dan Bauman, Here’s Who Was Hit Hardest by Higher Ed’s Pandemic-Driven Job
Losses, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.chronicle.com/article/hereswho-was-hit-hardest-by-higher-eds-pandemic-driven-job-losses [http://web.archive.org/
web/20211004230225/https://www.chronicle.com/article/heres-who-was-hit-hardest-byhigher-eds-pandemic-driven-job-losses].
322. Lilah Burke, Arbitrator Sides with U of Akron on Faculty Layoffs, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (Sept. 21, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2020/09/21/arbitratorsides-u-akron-faculty-layoffs [http://web.archive.org/web/20211004222103/https://www.
insidehighered.com/quicktakes/2020/09/21/arbitrator-sides-u-akron-faculty-layoffs].
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institutions,323 and Saint Xavier University announced it no longer
recognized its forty-year-old faculty union.324 As the chair of Saint
Xavier’s Board explained in a letter to the faculty, “[c]ontinued delay and
stalemate” with the union prevented the university from “adapt[ing] to
external pressures or act[ing] on innovation[.]”325 But the pandemic is
finally easing, and the recently-enacted $1.9 trillion relief bill allocates
$40 billion to public colleges and universities. As relief-bill funding flows
to public institutions and students begin to return to college campuses, it
remains to be seen whether this trend will reverse itself.
The response of colleges and universities to the pandemic illustrates
how dramatically faculty employment has shifted from decades past, when
higher education institutions generally hired faculty as a long-term
investment, with the expectation that faculty would earn tenure. This
Article addresses the failure of accrediting bodies to prevent or slow the
trend in higher education to employ faculty essentially as gig workers. It
proceeds from the premise that extreme reliance on adjunct faculty
undermines student learning, de-professionalizes faculty, and weakens
university governance. It concludes that the ABA’s specific, rule-based
approach to regulating faculty sufficiency, in spite of the potential costs,
is preferable to the approach of other accreditors, who utilize vague faculty
sufficiency standards. Either Congress or NCES should act to improve
mandatory reporting of faculty resources in higher education. Ironically,
by developing a survey instrument with a consistent definition of full-time
faculty, U.S. News has done more than most accreditors to make
institutional investments in faculty more transparent.

323. William H. Widen, Kansas, Crisis, Tenure and the US Contracts Clause, JURIST
(Jan. 25, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2021/01/william-widenkansas-tenure/ [http://web.archive.org/web/20211004222222/https://www.jurist.org/
commentary/2021/01/william-widen-kansas-tenure/].
324. Isaacs, supra note 34.
325. Emma Whitford, St. Xavier University Cuts Ties With FacultyIunion, INSIDE
HIGHER ED (Jun. 22, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/06/22/citingpandemic-related-pressures-st-xavier-university-cuts-ties-faculty-union [http://web.
archive.org/web/20211004231037/https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/06/22/citi
ng-pandemic-related-pressures-st-xavier-university-cuts-ties-faculty-union]. The
university’s decision also coincided with a National Labor Relations Board decision
holding it lacked jurisdiction to regulate religiously-affiliated institutions. Id.
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APPENDIX: RECENT ABA SANCTIONS AND WITHDRAWALS OF
APPROVAL326
Institution
Concordia
University
School of
Law
Arizona
Summit
Law
School

Date of
ABA
Action
Nov-20

ABA Standard(s)
at Issue

Comments

N/A

Aug-20

202a (Financial
resources)
301a (Rigorous
program)
309b (Academic
support)
501b (Admission
of those capable of
completion and
bar passage)
501a (Admissions
policies)
501b (Admission
of those capable of
completion and
bar passage)

ABA withdrew
approval when law
school closed in 2020
for financial reasons.
Put on probation in
2017. Due to continued
non-compliance with
standards, ABA
withdrew approval in
Aug 2020.

Valparaiso
University
School of
Law

Aug-20

Whittier
Law
School

Aug-20

N/A

Censured for
noncompliance but
later brought into
compliance. ABA
withdrew approval
when institution ceased
operations in Aug
2020.
ABA withdrew
approval when law
school closed in 2020
due to declining
enrollment and poor bar
passage of recent
graduates.

326. Public Accreditation Notices: Sanctions, Remedial Action, and Significant
Noncompliance Under Rule 11(a)(4), A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal
_education/public-notice/sanctions-remedial-action-noncompliance/ [http://web.archive.
org/web/20211004231535/https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/publicnotice/sanctions-remedial-action-noncompliance/] (last visited Dec. 30, 2021).
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Institution
Thomas
Jefferson
School of
Law

WAYNE LAW REVIEW
Date of
ABA
Action
May-19

Atlanta’s
John
Marshall
Law
School

Nov-18

Charlotte
School of
Law

Feb-18

Texas
Southern
University
Thurgood
Marshall
School of
Law

Jun-17

[Vol. 67:151

ABA Standard(s)
at Issue

Comments

202a (Financial
resources)
202d (Anticipated
financial
condition)
301a (Rigorous
program)
501b (Admission
of those capable of
completion and
bar passage)
301a (Rigorous
program)
309b (Academic
support)
501a (Admissions
policies)
501b (Admission
of those capable of
completion and
bar passage)
301a (Rigorous
program)
501a (Admissions
policies)
501b (Admission
of those capable of
completion and
bar passage)
104 (Reporting)

Placed on probation in
November 2017. Due
to continued noncompliance with the
standards, ABA
withdrew approval in
May 2019.

Due to continued noncompliance, ABA
placed institution on
probation and directed
remedial action. Taken
off probation in Dec
2019.

Censured and put on
probation for continued
non-compliance with
standards. ABA
withdrew approval
when state license to
operate JD program
expired in 2017.
Censured for
noncompliance with
Standard 104.

